Corporate Governance and Agency Problems

       

·                     A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51.

·                     F. Tsoulouhas, C. Knoeber and A. Agrawal. “Contests to Become CEO: Incentives, Selection and Handicaps.” Economic Theory, February 2007, V. 30(2), 195-221.

·                     A. Agrawal, C. Knoeber and F. Tsoulouhas. "Are Outsiders Handicapped in CEO Successions?”  Journal of Corporate Finance, June 2006, V. 12(3), 619-644.

·                     A. Agrawal and S. Chadha. “Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals.” Journal of Law and Economics, October 2005, V. 48(2), 371-406.

·                     A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?" Journal of Law and Economics, April 2001, V. 44(1), 179-198. 

·                     A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe, and J. Karpoff. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1999, V. 42(1), 23-56.

·                     A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. “Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Takeover.” Journal of     Financial Economics, February 1998, V. 47(2), 219-239.

·                     A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, September 1996, V. 31(3), 377-397.

·                     A. Agrawal and R. Walkling. “Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids.  The Journal of Finance, July 1994, V. 49(3), 985-1014.

·                     A. Agrawal and J. Narayanan. “Agency Costs, Ownership Control, and Dividend Policy: A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Theory.” Managerial and Decision Economics, March-April 1994, V. 15(2), 139-148.

·                      A. Agrawal and N. J. Nagarajan. “Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control: The Case of All-equity Firms.”  The Journal of Finance, September 1990, V. 45(4), pp. 1325-1331.

·                      A. Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker. “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:  The Case of Anti-takeover Charter Amendments.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 1990, Vol. 25(2), pp. 143-161.

·                     A. Agrawal, A. K. Makhija and G. N. Mandelker. “Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance in Electric and Gas Utilities: Some Empirical Evidence.” Financial Management, Winter 1991, V. 20(4), pp. 113-124.

·                     A. Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker.  “Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions.”  The Journal of Finance, September 1987, Vol. 42(4), pp. 823-837. 

 

 

Corporate Control

 

·                     A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. "Do Takeover Targets Under-perform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns."  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, December 2003, V. 38(5), 721-746.

·                     A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “The Post-merger Performance Puzzle.” Cary Cooper and Alan Gregory, eds., Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions, V. 1, New York, NY: Elsevier Science, 2000, 7-41.

·                     A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. “Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Takeover.” Journal of Financial Economics, February 1998, V. 47(2), 219-239.

·                     A. Agrawal and R. Walkling. “Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids.  The Journal of Finance, July 1994, V. 49(3), 985-1014.

·                     A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target Managers?” Journal of  Financial Economics, October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.

·                     A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe and G. N. Mandelker. “The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly.” Journal of Finance, September 1992, V. 47(4), pp. 1605-1621.

·                     A. Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker. “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:  The Case of Anti-takeover Charter Amendments.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 1990, Vol. 25(2), pp. 143-161. 

 

Security Analysts

 

·                     A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51. 

·                     A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and M. Chen. "Who is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal of Business, November 2006, V. 79(6).

 

Capital Structure and Dividend Policy

 

·                     A. Agrawal and J. Narayanan. “Agency Costs, Ownership Control, and Dividend Policy: A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Theory.” Managerial and Decision Economics, March-April 1994, V. 15(2), 139-148. 

·                     A. Agrawal and N. J. Nagarajan. “Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control: The Case of All-equity Firms.”  Journal of Finance, September 1990, V. 45(4), pp. 1325-1331.

 

 

Information and Market Efficiency

 

·                     A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51.

·                     A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and M. Chen. "Who is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal of Business, November 2006, V. 79(6).

·                     A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “The Post-merger Performance Puzzle.” Cary Cooper and Alan Gregory, eds., Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions, V. 1, New York, NY: Elsevier Science, 2000, 7-41.

·                     A. Agrawal and K. Tandon. “Anomalies or Illusions? Evidence from Stock Markets in Nineteen Countries.” Journal of International Money and Finance, February 1994, V. 13(1), 83-106. 

·                     A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe and G. N. Mandelker. “The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly.” The Journal of Finance, September 1992, V. 47(4), pp. 1605-1621.

 

Insider Trading

 

·                     A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target Managers?” Journal of  Financial Economics, October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.

 

 

Law and Economics

 

·                     A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51.

·                     A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and M. Chen. "Who is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal of Business, November 2006, V. 79(6).

·                     A. Agrawal and S. Chadha. “Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals.” Journal of Law and Economics, October 2005.

·                     A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?" Journal of Law and Economics, April 2001, V. 44(1), 179-198. 

·                     A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe, and J. Karpoff. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1999, V. 42(1), 23-56.

·                     A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target Managers?” Journal of Financial Economics, October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.