·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51.
·
F. Tsoulouhas, C. Knoeber and A. Agrawal. “Contests to Become CEO:
Incentives, Selection and Handicaps.” Economic Theory, February 2007, V.
30(2), 195-221.
·
A. Agrawal, C. Knoeber and F. Tsoulouhas. "Are Outsiders Handicapped
in CEO Successions?” Journal of Corporate Finance, June 2006,
V. 12(3), 619-644.
·
A. Agrawal
and S. Chadha. “Corporate
Governance and Accounting Scandals.” Journal of Law and Economics,
October 2005, V. 48(2), 371-406.
·
A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political
Role?" Journal
of Law and Economics, April 2001, V. 44(1), 179-198.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe, and J.
Karpoff. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes
Following the Revelation of Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1999, V. 42(1), 23-56.
·
A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. “Managerial Compensation and the Threat
of Takeover.” Journal
of Financial Economics, February 1998, V. 47(2),
219-239.
·
A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between
Managers and Shareholders." Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, September 1996, V. 31(3), 377-397.
·
A. Agrawal and R. Walkling. “Executive
Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids.” The
Journal of Finance, July 1994, V. 49(3), 985-1014.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Narayanan. “Agency
Costs, Ownership Control, and Dividend Policy: A Direct Test of the Free Cash
Flow Theory.”
Managerial and Decision Economics,
March-April 1994, V. 15(2), 139-148.
·
A. Agrawal and N. J. Nagarajan. “Corporate Capital
Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control: The Case of All-equity Firms.” The
Journal of Finance, September 1990, V. 45(4), pp. 1325-1331.
·
A. Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker. “Large Shareholders and the
Monitoring of Managers: The Case of
Anti-takeover Charter Amendments.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 1990, Vol.
25(2), pp. 143-161.
·
A. Agrawal, A. K. Makhija and G. N. Mandelker. “Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance in Electric and Gas
Utilities: Some Empirical Evidence.”
Financial Management, Winter 1991, V. 20(4), pp. 113-124.
·
A. Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker. “Managerial
Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions.” The
Journal of Finance, September 1987, Vol. 42(4), pp. 823-837.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. "Do
Takeover Targets Under-perform?
Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns." Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, December 2003, V. 38(5), 721-746.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “The Post-merger Performance
Puzzle.”
·
A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. “Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Takeover.” Journal of Financial Economics, February
1998, V. 47(2), 219-239.
·
A. Agrawal and R. Walkling. “Executive
Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids.” The
Journal of Finance, July 1994, V. 49(3), 985-1014.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target Managers?” Journal of Financial Economics,
October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe and G. N. Mandelker. “The Post-Merger Performance
of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly.” Journal of Finance, September 1992, V.
47(4), pp. 1605-1621.
·
A. Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker. “Large Shareholders and the
Monitoring of Managers: The Case of
Anti-takeover Charter Amendments.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 1990, Vol.
25(2), pp. 143-161.
Security
Analysts
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51.
·
A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and M.
Chen. "Who is Afraid of
Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the SEC’s
Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal of Business, November 2006, V.
79(6).
· A. Agrawal and J. Narayanan. “Agency Costs, Ownership Control, and Dividend Policy: A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Theory.” Managerial and Decision Economics, March-April 1994, V. 15(2), 139-148.
·
A. Agrawal and N. J. Nagarajan. “Corporate Capital
Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control: The Case of All-equity Firms.” Journal
of Finance, September 1990, V. 45(4), pp. 1325-1331.
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51.
·
A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and M.
Chen. "Who is Afraid of
Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal
of Business, November 2006, V. 79(6).
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “The Post-merger Performance
Puzzle.”
·
A. Agrawal and K. Tandon. “Anomalies or Illusions? Evidence from Stock Markets in Nineteen
Countries.” Journal of
International Money and Finance, February 1994, V. 13(1), 83-106.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe and G. N. Mandelker. “The Post-Merger
Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly.”
The Journal of Finance, September 1992,
V. 47(4), pp. 1605-1621.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target Managers?” Journal of Financial Economics,
October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51.
·
A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and M.
Chen. "Who is Afraid of
Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the SEC’s
Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal of Business, November 2006, V.
79(6).
·
A. Agrawal
and S. Chadha. “Corporate
Governance and Accounting Scandals.” Journal of Law and Economics,
October 2005.
·
A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. "Do
Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?" Journal of Law and Economics, April
2001, V. 44(1), 179-198.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe, and J.
Karpoff. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes
Following the Revelation of Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1999, V. 42(1), 23-56.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider
Trading by Target Managers?”
Journal of Financial Economics,
October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.