·
A. Agrawal and C. Knoeber. “Corporate Governance and
Firm Performance.” Thomas, Christopher R. and William F. Shughart II, eds., Oxford Handbook in Managerial Economics, 2012,
Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Journal
of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51(3), 503-537.
·
F. Tsoulouhas, C. Knoeber and A. Agrawal. “Contests to Become CEO:
Incentives, Selection and Handicaps.” Economic Theory, February 2007, V.
30(2), 195-221.
·
A. Agrawal, C. Knoeber and F. Tsoulouhas. "Are Outsiders
Handicapped in CEO Successions?” Journal of Corporate Finance, June 2006,
V. 12(3), 619-644.
·
A.
Agrawal and S. Chadha. “Corporate
Governance and Accounting Scandals.” Journal of Law and Economics,
October 2005, V. 48(2),
371-406.
·
A. Agrawal and C.
Knoeber. "Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political
Role?" Journal
of Law and Economics, April 2001, V. 44(1), 179-198.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe, and
J. Karpoff. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following
the Revelation of Fraud." Journal
of Law and Economics, April 1999, V. 42(1), 23-56.
·
A. Agrawal and C.
Knoeber. “Managerial Compensation and the Threat of Takeover.” Journal
of Financial Economics, February 1998, V. 47(2),
219-239.
·
A. Agrawal and C.
Knoeber. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control
Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders." Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, September 1996, V. 31(3), 377-397.
·
A. Agrawal and R.
Walkling. “Executive Careers and
Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids.” The Journal of Finance,
July 1994, V. 49(3), 985-1014.
·
A. Agrawal and J.
Narayanan. “Agency Costs, Ownership Control, and Dividend
Policy: A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Theory.”
Managerial and Decision Economics, March-April
1994, V. 15(2), 139-148.
·
A. Agrawal and N.
J. Nagarajan. “Corporate Capital
Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control: The Case of All-equity Firms.” The
Journal of Finance, September 1990, V. 45(4), pp. 1325-1331.
·
A.
Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker. “Large
Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:
The Case of Anti-takeover Charter Amendments.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, June 1990, Vol. 25(2), pp. 143-161.
·
A. Agrawal, A. K. Makhija and G. N. Mandelker. “Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance in Electric and Gas
Utilities: Some Empirical Evidence.”
Financial Management, Winter 1991, V. 20(4), pp. 113-124.
·
A. Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker. “Managerial
Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions.” The
Journal of Finance, September 1987, Vol. 42(4), pp. 823-837.
·
A. Agrawal and
T. Nasser. “Insider Trading in
Takeover Targets.” Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(3), June 2012, 598-625.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. "Do
Takeover Targets Under-perform?
Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns." Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, December 2003, V. 38(5),
721-746.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “The
Post-merger Performance Puzzle.” Cary Cooper and Alan Gregory,
eds., Advances in Mergers and
Acquisitions, V. 1, New York, NY: Elsevier Science, 2000, 7-41.
·
A. Agrawal and C.
Knoeber. “Managerial Compensation and the Threat of
Takeover.” Journal of
Financial Economics, February 1998, V. 47(2), 219-239.
·
A. Agrawal and R.
Walkling. “Executive Careers and
Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids.” The Journal of Finance,
July 1994, V. 49(3), 985-1014.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target Managers?” Journal of Financial Economics,
October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe and
G. N. Mandelker. “The Post-Merger
Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly.”
Journal of Finance, September 1992,
V. 47(4), pp. 1605-1621.
·
A. Agrawal and G. N. Mandelker. “Large Shareholders and the
Monitoring of Managers: The Case of
Anti-takeover Charter Amendments.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, June 1990, Vol.
25(2), pp. 143-161.
·
A. Agrawal and
T. Cooper. “Accounting Scandals
in IPO Firms: Do Underwriters and VCs Help?” Forthcoming, Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy.
·
A.
Agrawal and S. Chadha. “Corporate Governance and
Accounting Scandals.” Journal of Law and Economics, October 2005.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe, and
J. Karpoff. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation
of Fraud." Journal of Law
and Economics, April 1999, V. 42(1), 23-56.
·
A. Agrawal and J.
Narayanan. “Agency Costs, Ownership Control, and Dividend Policy:
A Direct Test of the Free Cash Flow Theory.” Managerial and Decision Economics, March-April 1994, V. 15(2),
139-148.
·
A. Agrawal and N. J. Nagarajan. “Corporate Capital
Structure, Agency Costs and Ownership Control: The Case of All-equity Firms.” Journal
of Finance, September 1990, V. 45(4), pp. 1325-1331.
Venture Capital and IPOs
·
A. Agrawal and
T. Cooper. “Accounting Scandals
in IPO Firms: Do Underwriters and VCs Help?” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, V. 19(4), Winter 2010, 1117–1181.
Security Analysts
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Analyst Conflicts and Research
Quality.” Forthcoming, Quarterly
Journal of Finance, 2012.
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Journal
of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51(3), 503-537.
·
A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and M. Chen. "Who is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts
Following the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal
of Business, November 2006, V. 79(6), 2811-2834.
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Analyst Conflicts and
Research Quality.” Forthcoming, Quarterly
Journal of Finance, 2012.
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51.
·
A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and
M. Chen. "Who is Afraid
of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the
SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal of Business,
November 2006, V. 79(6), 2811-2834.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “The
Post-merger Performance Puzzle.” Cary Cooper and Alan Gregory,
eds., Advances in Mergers and
Acquisitions, V. 1, New York, NY: Elsevier Science, 2000, 7-41.
·
A. Agrawal and K. Tandon. “Anomalies or Illusions? Evidence from Stock Markets in Nineteen
Countries.” Journal of
International Money and Finance, February 1994, V. 13(1), 83-106.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe and
G. N. Mandelker. “The Post-Merger
Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly.”
The Journal of Finance, September
1992, V. 47(4), pp. 1605-1621.
·
A. Agrawal and
T. Nasser. “Insider Trading in
Takeover Targets.” Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(3), June 2012, 598-625.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider Trading by Target Managers?” Journal of Financial Economics,
October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.
·
A. Agrawal and
T. Nasser. “Insider Trading in
Takeover Targets.” Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(3), June 2012, 598-625.
·
A. Agrawal and
T. Cooper. “Accounting Scandals
in IPO Firms: Do Underwriters and VCs Help?” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, V. 19(4), Winter 2010, 1117–1181.
·
A. Agrawal and M. Chen. “Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations.” Journal
of Law and Economics, August 2008, V. 51(3), 503-537.
·
A. Agrawal, S. Chadha and
M. Chen. "Who is Afraid
of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-side Analysts Following the
SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rules." Journal of Business,
November 2006, V. 79(6), 2811-2834.
·
A. Agrawal
and S. Chadha. “Corporate
Governance and Accounting Scandals.” Journal of Law and Economics,
October 2005.
·
A. Agrawal and C.
Knoeber. "Do Some Outside
Directors Play a Political Role?" Journal of Law and Economics, April 2001, V. 44(1), 179-198.
·
A. Agrawal, J. Jaffe, and
J. Karpoff. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes
Following the Revelation of Fraud." Journal of Law and Economics, April 1999, V. 42(1), 23-56.
·
A. Agrawal and J. Jaffe. “Does Section 16b Deter Insider
Trading by Target Managers?”
Journal of Financial Economics,
October-November 1995, V. 39(2 & 3), 295-319.