Welcome to TiddlyWiki created by Jeremy Ruston, Copyright © 2007 UnaMesa Association
{{resize{[>img[http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/images/dmgpic.jpg]]}}} I am an Associate Professor in the [[Department of Political Science|http://www.as.ua.edu/psc/]] at the [[University of Alabama|http://www.ua.edu]] where I teach courses on International Conflict, Democratization, and American Foreign Policy. My research interests focus on the causes and consequences of international conflict and the international factors that contribute to intrastate conflict and state development. I have written articles that have appeared in such journals as //International Studies Quarterly//, the //Journal of Conflict Resolution//, the //Journal of Peace Research//, the //Journal of Politics//, and //Security Studies//, and my research is currently funded by the National Science Foundation and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. For a closer look at specific research topics and current classes, please follow the individual hyperlinks on the left.
You can view a .pdf version of my ''[[Vita|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Gibler.Vita.pdf]]'' or use the [[Wiki|Vita]] format with links to individual papers.
You can also use the following link to scan the descriptions of all my current ''[[Working Papers]]''.
[[Link|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/ConferenceProgram.htm]] to recent UA Conference on Territory, Rivalry, and Domestic Politics.
[[Link|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/MIDsettlements.htm]] to ~NSF-funded project on Militarized Interstate Dispute Settlements..
''Recent UA News:'' [[NSF Award|http://uanews.ua.edu/2009/09/ua-political-scientists-receive-205000-grant-to-study-international-conflict-resolution/]], [[Guggenheim Award|http://uanews.ua.edu/2008/01/ua-political-scientist-wins-prestigious-guggenheim-grant/]], [[Citation Announcement|http://uanews.ua.edu/anews2007/jan07/politic010907.htm]], and [[Educated Guesses|http://uanews.ua.edu/anews2008/guess09/iraq.htm]]
This website was created using [[TiddlyWiki|http://www.tiddlywiki.com/]], which is "a popular free //~MicroContent ~WikiWikiWeb// created by ~JeremyRuston and a busy Community of independent developers. It's written in HTML, CSS and ~JavaScript to run on any modern browser without needing any ~ServerSide logic" ([[Source|http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TiddlyWiki]]).
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''Last major update:'' November 25, 2007
''Last minor update:'' May 17, 2009
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The International Studies Major should provide a good background for those interested in the MBA. However, most schools also want students to have some real world experience following graduation before they will accept a student for admission. Be sure to check out [[UA's Business School|http://manderson.cba.ua.edu/]] which is top-notch.
For a critique of general business education, see [[this link|http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/10/18/khurana]].
The Princeton Review seems to offer some excellent advice [[here|http://www.princetonreview.com/law/research/articleIndex.asp]]. Check out [[UA's Law School Website|http://law.ua.edu/]], too, including [[this link|http://www.law.ua.edu/prospective/]] for prospective students.
I generally tell my students that they can take any classes they want and still do well in law school. There are usually no minimum requirements. Often, too, students will tend to do well in those classes in which they are interested.
[[Here|http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&ct=res&cd=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.politicalstudies.org%2Fpdf%2Fpsr%2Fhix.pdf&ei=9pBmR6a1DYL-gAT_l9GbDg&usg=AFQjCNGPIQtp49WL7CJ3arFyWcfsuTfVfQ&sig2=egWcN4LOFJAqvLkyjRpgZQ]] is a world wide ranking of Political Science Graduate Schools by British Political Scientist Simon Hix at the London School of Economics. The actual rankings are in tabular form within the article. Note that Alabama does pretty well!
There are several subfields within Political Science, so these rankings may not always hold in a particular field. If you have questions, talk to your advisor.
''Note:'' Pre-registration for the Summer and Fall 2008 semester is now over.
I will not be holding office hours for International Studies advisees until the middle of this semester, when priority registration for Spring 2009 begins.
On the ''International Studies Program'':
1. [[What is an International Studies Major or Minor?]]
2. [[What can I do with an International Studies Major or Minor?]]
3. [[How do I become an International Studies Major or Minor?]]
4. [[What are the requirements for an International Studies Major or Minor?]]
On ''Advising'':
5. [[How do I get assigned an advisor?]]
6. [[When should I meet with my advisor?]]
7. [[What should I bring to an advising appointment?]]
8. [[What classes should I take?]]
9. [[What do I do after I meet with my advisor?]]
10. [[How do I petition to graduate?]]
On ''Graduate Schools'':
11. [[Advice on graduate schools]].
12. [[Advice on Law Schools]].
13. [[Advice on Business Schools]].
''Abstract:'' An extensive body of evidence has been accumulated showing that alliances are more often followed by war than by peace (Singer and Small, 1966b; Levy, 1981). It has also been convincingly demonstrated that alliances are associated with the expansion of war (Siverson and King, 1979; 1980; Siverson and Starr, 1990), and alliance polarization and the buildup of alliances in the system are associated with world wars (Kegley, 1994; Wayman, 1984; Midlarsky, 1983; 1986). Nevertheless, a significant number of alliances are not followed by war. Levy (1981) reports that 44% of neutrality and defense pacts in the 17th century, 33% in the 18th century, 72% in the 19th century, and 13% in the 20th century are not followed by a war involving an ally within five years. The variation across centuries, especially the large percentage of peaceful 19th century alliances, suggests that not all alliances are created equal.
This article identifies a large portion of the peaceful alliances as territorial settlement treaties. By resolving territorial disputes between alliance members, these treaties remove one of the most contentious issues from the agenda of states and pacify some of the most traditionally belligerent states in the system. It is argued that the identification of these alliances is an important step toward re-conceptualizing the alliance variable since the territorial settlement treaties behave very differently from what realist theories would predict. Instead of trying to balance power in a region or in the system, these alliances exhibit the robust and multifaceted nature of diplomacy, demonstrating that a common practice having the same form (forming an alliance) can have very different motivations behind it. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that researchers remove these alliances from their data analyses (or, at the very least, control for them) if they are investigating the paths or correlates to war. The presence of these irenic alliances would tend to mute most findings.
[[Off-print|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/1996.CMPS.Gibler.pdf]].
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=alliances+that+never+balance%22&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=&as_ylo=1996&as_yhi=1999&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 1996. Alliances that Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty. Conflict Management and Peace Science. Volume 16: 1, pp. 75-97.
''Reprinted in:'' A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict, edited by P. F. Diehl. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999: 181-204.
''Abstract:'' Previous studies have not established a consistent link between regime type and alliance formation, despite the relevance of the decision to ally in a number of arguments about regime type and alliance behavior. The inconsistency in these findings turns largely on choice of research design and variable definition; when the dependent variable is alliance formation, democratic dyads are unlikely to ally, but when the dependent variable is the presence of an alliance tie, democratic dyads are likely to be allied. Under a standard research design, the authors find both claims to be true and propose a test of an explanation for this tendency of autocratic states to democratize in alliances. They show that the presence of a defense pact with all neighboring states reduces the likelihood that a state will be targeted with a territorial militarized dispute, reduces the level of state militarization, and increases the likelihood of democratic transitions.
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler+wolford&as_publication=journal+of+conflict+resolution&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Replication Data:'' [[dyad-year data|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/data/jcrdata.zip]] and [[state-year data|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/data/jcrdata1.zip]].
''Co-author info:'' [[Scott Wolford|http://spot.colorado.edu/~wolfordm/]] received his Masters at the University of Kentucky. He is now an assistant professor at the University of Colorado.
''First Paragraph:'' "In its barest form an alliance is a formal commitment by two or more states to some future action. The action involved could entail almost anything - detailed military planning, consultation during a crisis, or a promise by one state to abstain from an upcoming war. Once reached, the agreement is usually in written form and is made public to other states in the system at the discretion of the states making the alliance. Though less important today, secret alliances and commitments have affected the outcomes of many crises, battles, and wars. For example, the ~Hitler-Stalin Pact (1939), with its many secret accords, immediately sealed the fate of the much weaker Poland..."
[[Off-print|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/VIOencyc.2008.alliances.pdf]].
Google Scholar.
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 2008. Alliances. In Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Volume II, edited by L. Kurtz and J. Turpin. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
''Abstract:''
Off print.
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=alliances+why+some+cause&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=What+Do+We+Know+About+War&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
Citation: Douglas M. Gibler. 2000. Alliances: Why Some Cause War and Why Others Cause Peace. In What do we know about war?, edited by J. A. Vasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield: 145-164.
''Abstract:'' There exists no consensus as to what indicates state satisfaction with the systemic status quo even though it has been a widely used concept in the empirical literature on war. This is surprising because satisfaction is not a new concept in international relations and has been accorded a central role in many theories of war. In this paper, I present a measure of satisfaction based on the cost of money for sovereign borrowers and compare that measure to several leading indicators of satisfaction. I find little correlation among the existing indicators and similar variation in their ability to predict conflict. Overall, my results point to the cost of money as the most valid indicator of satisfaction as it: 1) best predicts behaviors consistent with satisfied/ dissatisfied states, 2) is least susceptible to strategic behaviors related to conflict, 3) is least likely to obscure the impact of independent variables common to conflict studies, and 4) can also be included with measures of dyadic preferences in most models of conflict.
[[Paper.|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Satisfaction.Gibler.pdf]] [[Web Appendix.|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Satisfaction.WebAppendix.pdf]]
''Status:'' Under revision for invitation to revise and resubmit to International Studies Quarterly.
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. Working Paper. An Assessment of the Validity of Empirical Measures of State Satisfaction with the Status Quo
''Abstract:'' Arguing that most empirical studies of war arbitrarily limit themselves to analyses of the state system after 1815, this paper develops extensions of the Correlates of War formal alliance and system membership data sets from 1648 to 1815. An initial comparison of summary statistics indicates that alliance patterns in the post-Westphalian period were similar, in many respects, to the alliance patterns of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, inclusion of the new alliance data in re-analyses of alliance war-proneness (Levy, 1983) and alliance polarization show that the often noted inter-century difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may be exaggerated. Nineteenth century alliances were not less likely to be followed by war than alliances formed in other centuries.
[[Off-print|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/1999.II.Gibler.pdf]].
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=An+Extension+of+the+Correlates+of+War+Formal+Alliance+Data+Set&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=international+interactions&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]]
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 1999. An Extension of the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Data Set, 1648-1814. International Interactions. Volume 25: 1, pp. 1-28.
In my 2004 Journal of Peace Research article I developed (along with two former graduate students) a dataset of all arms races that occurred during "strategic rivalry". Using the new dataset, we found several interesting relationships: First, arms races do not deter; MID onset is much more likely during or after an arms race than before one. Second, arms races also escalate disputes to war, again countering deterrence theory, but most of the dispute escalation to war occurs in the dyads surrounding the world wars.
I am working on a second arms race paper that provides an explanation for the temporal differences we found in the first paper -- namely, the Cold War arms race cases did not use the traditional means of battleship building, compulsory military service, and budget outlays to compete. Instead, the more recent arms race cases were used by poor countries trying to undercut their neighbors with insurgents. Many international terrorist groups can also be traced to these "non-traditional" arms races. I identify the non-traditional arms race cases and show that most led to civil war, assassinations, and rebellion rather than interstate war, thus demonstrating that arms races are not peaceful, even during this period.
!Working Papers
Working Paper. [[Peaceful Arms Races?: The Non-traditional Arms Race of Insurgency and Terrorism]].
!Publications
2005. [[Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Interdependent Racing and the Likelihood of Conflict in Rival States.]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 42: 2, pp. 131-147.
2002. [[The Steps to War in Asia, 1931-45.]] Security Studies. Volume 10: 3, pp. 1-45.
I direct a summer abroad program located in Brussels, Belgium. The city is home to the major institutions of the ''European Union'', including the ''European Commission'', ''Council of the European Union'', ''European Summit'' and a second seat of the ''European Parliament''. The ''North Atlantic Treaty Organization'' headquarters is also located in the suburbs of Brussels. The program takes advantage of this extraordinarily large concentration of international institutions by providing a set of courses that examines ~American-EU relations, the nature of federalism and sovereignty within the states of Europe, and the history and effects of conflict on the continent and the world. The locale provides a unique opportunity for a "hands on" approach to studying international politics in action. The city's central location also allows easy weekend excursions for the group to go to ''London, England'', and ''Paris, France'', as well as several day trips to other Belgian cities.
For more information about the program, please contact me by email at [[dmgibler(at)bama.ua.edu|mailto:dmgibler@bama.ua.edu]] and visit the [[UA in Belgium program website|http://uabelgium.wordpress.com/]].
''Abstract:'' Recent criticisms of the Democratic Peace offer three alternative explanations for the association between joint democracy and peace -- economic development (Gartzke, 2007), complex data dependence (Ward, Siverson, and Xao, 2007), and peaceful international borders (Gibler, 2007). This paper assesses these explanations with a unified framework that demonstrates economic development (or the "capitalist peace") is a function of border settlement. I also discuss how the spread of peaceful borders explains why democracies and rivalries tend to cluster separately in space and time, thus resolving the questions raised in the data dependence argument.
''Status:'' In progress for presentation at the March, 2008 International Studies Association Meeting in San Francisco, CA.
''Availability:'' Please email me for a copy of the conference paper.
''Book Abstract:'' This book develops my argument on territorial threat and extends the theory to individual level behavior, state development, and dyadic conflict. The theoretical foundation for the argument was recently published in [[ISQ|Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict.]]. Individual level behavior analyses can be found in my [[2007 JoP article|Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat: A Cross-National Study.]], and I am currently finishing a broader argument on state development, which can also be found in [[this paper|Outside-In The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization]].
Status: In progress. I hope to finish the book during 2009.
Funding: This project is currently being funded by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.
[[Outline of Book|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Gibler.Book Outline.pdf]]
''Abstract:'' I argue that democracy and peace are both symptoms - not causes - of the removal of territorial issues between neighbors, and in this sense the "empirical law" of democratic peace may in fact be spurious. As democracies tend to stabilize their border relations prior to becoming democratic, democracy as an independent variable in conflict studies captures the effects of an absence of territorial issues. States without these issues are less prone to disputes prior to regime type, and I show that, after controlling for the presence of stable borders, joint democracy exercises no pacifying effect on conflict behavior from 1946 to 1999.
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=bordering+on+peace&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=&as_ylo=2007&as_yhi=2007&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Replication Data.''
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 2007. Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict. International Studies Quarterly. Vol 51: 3 (September), pp. 509-532.
I am always best reached via email at [[dmgibler(at)bama.ua.edu|mailto:dmgibler@bama.ua.edu]].
My mailing address is:
[[Department of Political Science|http://www.as.ua.edu/psc/]]
[[University of Alabama|http://www.ua.edu]]
Box 870213
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0213
My office phone is (205) 348-3808, but please realize that I check voicemail about once every other week (email me instead!).
Our departmental fax number is (205) 348-5248.
''Abstract:'' Research has shown that a large number of interstate disputes frequently occur between the same pairs of states and that these rivalries tend to include wars more often than not. This article examines whether states involved in rivalry can take steps to manage disputed issues and decrease the probability of the rivalry escalating to war.
The analyses presented here suggest that states can and do take steps to manage their disputes. It is shown that certain alliance commitments are actually attempts to manage conflict between rival states by removing territorial issues from their agendas. These territorial settlement treaties fundamentally change the nature of the rivalry by changing the issues of contention. Once this occurs, the nature of future disputes is altered and the probability of repeated disputes decreases. Even in enduring rivalries, rivals that have formed prior territorial settlements experience much less conflict than other rivals. Lastly, it is also shown that major-major, enduring rivalries with prior territorial settlements take much longer before going to war-they will suffer through twice as many disputes and four times as many years of rivalry before going to war than other enduring rivals.
Methodologically, this paper utilizes the “rivalry approach” recently advocated by Goertz and Diehl (1996) in addition to the more familiar cross-sectional, dyad-year approach. The use of the rivalry approach is believed to be especially warranted considering this issue’s focus upon rivalry termination. Traditional cross-sectional approaches often obscure dynamic relationships that exist between rivals and ignore fundamental changes that occur over time. Obviously, the termination of the rivalry is just such a fundamental change and cannot occur without prior shifts in the rivalry relationship. Therefore, rivalry termination should provide excellent testing ground for this new approach.
[[Off-print|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/1997.II.Gibler.pdf]].
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=control+the+issues&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=international+interactions&as_ylo=1997&as_yhi=1997&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 1997. Control the Issues, Control the Conflict: The Effects of Alliances that Settle Territorial Issues on Interstate Rivalries. International Interactions. Volume 22: 4, pp. 341-68.
''Abstract:'' United States Professional Military Education (US PME) has commonly been blamed for training some of the worst abusers of human rights - Latin American dictators and thugs like Argentina’s Leopoldo Galtieri and Panama's Manuel Noriega, Timorese counter-insurgents, and even some officers who would eventually serve the Taliban in Afghanistan. We test this conventional wisdom using both large-N analyses and case studies of Argentina, Greece, and Taiwan. Our large-N results suggest that US PME trained foreign officers prove to be an important stabilizing force during times of democratic transition. Our case studies uncover very few cases of US PME officers linked to human rights abuses; interestingly, in each of our cases, the US PME trained officers provided the initial infrastructure need to begin domestic military education programs that encouraged civilian control of the military in emerging democracies.
''Availability:'' [[Paper|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Ruby.Gibler.EJIR.forthcoming.pdf]]
''Citation:'' Tomislav Z. Ruby and Douglas M. Gibler. Forthcoming. ~Coup-Proofing while Democratizing: The United States Professional Military Education of Foreign Officers, 1950-1999. European Journal of International Relations.
''Co-author info:'' Lt. Col. Tomislav Z. Ruby received his Ph.D. at the University of Kentucky and is currently serving in the United States Air Force.
I am currently teaching [[PSC641 Issues in International Relations|http://dl.dropbox.com/u/48922/Spring%202010/PSC641.Spring2010.pdf]] during the Spring 2010 semester.
My teaching blog, which supports the course, can be found [[here|http://giblersclasses.wordpress.com/]].
Revised Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset, 1816 to present.
An Extension of the Correlates of War Membership Dataset, 1648-1815.
An Extension of the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset, 1648-1815.
Extended Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1993-2002 (NSF funded).
Arms race dataset, 1816-2000 (with Marc Hutchison and Toby Rider).
''UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA:''
{{indent{International Relations Search Committee, 2009-09 (chair)
{{indent{Comparative Politics Search Committee, 2007-08
{{indent{Graduate Committee, 2007-
{{indent{International Relations Search Committee, 2006-07
{{indent{Undergraduate Committee, 2006-07
{{indent{Dissertation Committees: Wanfa Zhang (chair), Jane Munga (chair), George Kelley (co-chair), Jenna Lea, Paulina Pospieszna, and Andy Akin.
''UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY:''
{{indent{Acting Director of Graduate Studies, Fall 2004.
{{indent{Graduate Committee, 2000-2005.
{{indent{Undergraduate Committee, 1999-2000.
{{indent{Recruiter for graduate program, Ralph Bunche Institute at Duke University, 2001-2003.
{{indent{International Relations/Comparative Search Committee, 2005-06.
{{indent{Comparative Search Committee, 2000-01.
{{indent{Library Liaison, 2002-2005.
{{indent{Departmental Secretary, 1999-2000.
''STANFORD UNIVERSITY:''
{{indent{Admissions Committee, International Policy Studies Program, 1998-99.
{{indent{Senior Honors College Advisor, 1998-99.
{{indent{Firestone Award (outstanding IR senior thesis) Committee Member, 1998-99.
''Abstract:'' A debate still persists over the likelihood of conflict following state transitions to democracy. We resolve this debate in part by closely examining every single militarized dispute and international crisis during the period immediately after transition. Contrary to Mansfield and Snyder's theory, and recent empirical work on consolidated democracies, our statistical results demonstrate that the likelihood of conflict is quite small for new democracies, no matter the type, speed, or overall success of the transition. Further, our qualitative examination of the disputes and crises of the new democracies suggests that the small amount of conflict that does occur in new democracies is almost always of low salience and often not even reciprocated. Thus, our results should finally resolve claims over the warproneness of democracies in transition.
[[Powerpoint presentation|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/PSSI2006.pdf]]
''Status:'' Under revision for submission.
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler and John Oneal. 2008. Dangerous Democratizers? New Democracies and the Likelihood of Conflict. Working Paper. University of Alabama.
''Co-author info:'' [[John Oneal|http://www.as.ua.edu/psc/faculty_and_staff/faculty_directory/oneal/index.php]] is professor emeritus at the University of Alabama.
''Conference Presentations:'' Peace Science Society (International) Meeting (November, 2006) in Columbus, Ohio.
[[About Me]] [[Contact Info]]
''PROJECT SUMMARY''
Proposed Activity
This proposal seeks funding to analyze the effectiveness of substantive political settlements in ending international conflict. The recent literature on peace agreements often concludes that treaty terms matter little in determining the durability of peace following interstate conflict. The authors argue that this finding results from datasets that are ill-suited for examining the role of issue settlement following conflict. Current tests of negotiated settlements focus on the presence of negotiation rather than the removal of contested issues from states’ agendas. Further, by examining mostly wars, current studies exclude the many successful settlements that resolve conflict short of war.
To address these concerns, the authors plan to collect and code every formal negotiated settlement that follows a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) between 1816 and 2001. There are 416 dyadic cases of negotiated settlement following MIDs, and the project will code each agreement for the presence and substance of political settlement. The authors will also collect information regarding the enforcement mechanisms used in the treaty, the presence of third-party mediators and guarantors, and the specifics of the negotiation process for each settlement. All information collected in this project would be available to the public in aggregated and single-case, searchable form.
Intellectual Merit
Resolving conflict represents a core value of political science, and “who gets what, when, and how” is, quite literally, simply another way of defining the substance of negotiated settlements. This research project suggests that political settlements can have lasting effects for peace, which, if true, could alter the conclusions of a significant number of current research programs. Data on negotiations, third party mediators and treaty design will also help advance the peace-making and treaty design literatures.
The authors also argue that political settlements can have strong effects as an independent variable predicting domestic-level changes in institutions and individual behavior. The positive peace of issue settlement can lead to decentralization, democratization, and political tolerance. Negative peace, however, tends to reinforce centralization and authoritarian tendencies among individuals and within institutions. These arguments obviously cut across many different literatures and subfields.
Broader Impact of Project
In addition to the immediate impact on the peace agreement literature, the analyses completed with this dataset have important implications for the scholarly literatures on studies of rivalry, territorial conflict, the bargaining literature, and research programs based on more general theories of cooperation and treaty formation. Each of these literatures has used the dichotomous imposed/negotiated settlement variable in analyses of MID data. Richer information on settlement types would allow more comprehensive tests of these theories.
The implied policy prescriptions of the current peace agreement literature should also not be forgotten. The current literature suggests that the balance of capabilities controls the likelihood of peace, and agreements must therefore reflect that balance in order to be durable. Policymakers practicing negotiations based on the current literature are using knowledge gained from a severely selected sample of cases, which is particularly unfortunate if political settlements or enforcement mechanisms can indeed prevent disputes from escalating to war. By broadening the scope of peace agreement research, both temporally and for conflicts short of war, the authors hope to provide a much better understanding of the necessary conditions for a durable peace.
''Status:'' Under revision for August 2008 submission.
''Availability:'' [[Full proposal|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Gibler.DeRouen.NSF.012009.pdf]]
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler and Karl ~DeRouen, Jr., Working Paper. Does Force or Agreement Lead to Peace?: A Collection and Analysis of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Settlement, 1816 to 2001
''Co-author info:'' [[Karl DeRouen, Jr.|http://www.as.ua.edu/psc/faculty_and_staff/faculty_directory/derouen/index.php]] is a Professor at the University of Alabama.
Post-doctoral Fellowship, International Policy Studies, Stanford University, 1998-1999
Ph D., Vanderbilt University, July 1997
{{indent{Dissertation: An Empirical Typology of Alliances, 1648-1980.
{{indent{Major Field: International Relations; Minor field: American Government.
Hoover Summer Program in Game Theory, June 1996.
ICPSR program in quantitative methods University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1995.
B.S., Belmont University, August 1992.
''Abstract:'' NATO has recently expanded to include several eastern European, formerly communist states. This article uses empirical evidence on alliances and war to argue that this expansion and plans to expand NATO even more may pose a serious threat to international peace since the expanded alliance possesses two of the three major factors that have been found to be associated with war-prone alliances. In addition, it is argued that the expanded alliance may greatly hamper Russia's transition to democracy. The article concludes that a better long-term policy for NATO states to pursue would be an expansion that included Russia but that would be restructured to resolve outstanding territorial disputes in ways similar to the Congress of Vienna of 1815. The potential impact of this expanded NATO on political transitions in the Balkan states is also discussed.
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=east+or+further+east&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=journal+of+peace+research&as_ylo=1999&as_yhi=1999&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 1999. East or Further East? Journal of Peace Research. Volume 36: 6, pp. 627-637.
''Abstract:'' United States Professional Military Education (US PME) has commonly been blamed for training some of the worst abusers of human rights - Latin American dictators and thugs like Argentina’s Leopoldo Galtieri and Panama's Manuel Noriega, Timorese counter-insurgents, and even some officers who would eventually serve the Taliban in Afghanistan. We assess the curricula of US PME schools and argue that the conventional wisdom is quite wrong. We also provide several examples of how US PME has contributed to the initiation and stabilization of democracy in such countries as Argentina, Greece, and Taiwan.
[[Page Proofs.|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/2002-03.JFQ.GiblerRuby.pdf]]
''Google Scholar.''
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler and Lt. Col. Tomislav Z. Ruby. 2002/03. Educating Foreign Officers. Joint Force Quarterly. 33 (Winter): 119-123.
Student evaluations of my teaching are available for both my [[UA classes|UA teaching evaluation summary data]] and the [[classes I taught at the University of Kentucky|UK teaching evaluations]].
''Abstract:'' This article examines the role of NATO in aiding democratic transitions and survival in the former Soviet republics. The authors argue that the level of external threat is a determining factor in centralization, militarization, and ultimately regime type. States tend to be democratic or are likely to make the transition toward democracy when threat levels are low, while autocracies are more likely to be found in states targeted by higher levels of threat. Building on recent findings examining the link between democracies and alliance, the authors demonstrate that NATO has been an effective guarantor of territorial sovereignty and independence in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Moldova, reducing the level of threat experienced by each state, thus assuring the survival of decentralized and democratic governments. Former Soviet republics targeted by high levels of threat have reverted to or maintained centralized, autocratic forms of government.
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler+sewell&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler and Jamil Sewell. 2006. External Threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited. Journal of Peace Research. Volume 43: 4 (July), 413-431.
''Co-author info:'' [[Jamil Sewell|http://jamil.sewell.googlepages.com/jamilsewell'swebpage]] was one of my graduate students at the University of Kentucky.
''External Scholarship:''
{{indent{2008-09, Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation Grant.
{{indent{2000-2002, National Science Foundation Research Grant.
''External Travel Grants:''
{{indent{2008, International Studies Association Travel Grant.
{{indent{1996, APSA Travel Grant.
''Internal Scholarship:''
{{indent{2004 University of Kentucky Faculty Enhancement Grant, $8,000
{{indent{2003 University of Kentucky Faculty Enhancement Grant, $5,000
{{indent{2003 University of Kentucky Departmental Research Grant, $1,000
{{indent{2001 University of Kentucky Departmental Research Grant, $1,000
{{indent{2000 University of Kentucky Faculty Enhancement Grant, $5,000
{{indent{1996/97, Vanderbilt Dissertation Enhancement Grant.
{{indent{1994, Vanderbilt Graduate Student Research first place winner in Social Sciences.
{{indent{1993-1997, Department of Political Science Fellowship, Vanderbilt University.
''Internal Travel Grants:''
{{indent{2007 Capstone International Travel Award, $1,000.
Becoming an International Studies Major or Minor is easy. Before pre-registration for the next semester of classes, simply go by the main Political Science office on the 3rd floor of [[ten Hoor Hall| http://tour.ua.edu/tourstops/tenhoor.html]] and pick up a change of Major/Minor form.
You will be [[assigned an advisor|How do I get assigned an advisor?]]. Then, fill out the change of Major/Minor form and bring it with you to your [[meeting with your advisor|What should I bring to an advising appointment?]]. There is no need to meet with your advisor prior to pre-registration. See [[When should I meet with my advisor?]]
When you decide to major or minor in International Studies, you should go to the main Political Science office on the 3rd floor of [[ten Hoor Hall| http://tour.ua.edu/tourstops/tenhoor.html]]. There, you will be given the proper forms and will be assigned an advisor for the next round of pre-registration. See [[When should I meet with my advisor?]]
Here are the [[graduation requirements|http://www.as.ua.edu/undergraduates/graduation_requirements/]] in the College of Arts and Sciences. Notice at the bottom of these requirements is the following statement: "Students must submit an application for degree form in 200 Clark Hall the semester before they plan to graduate. See your advisor for more information."
During the first semester of your senior year, you should bring a completed petition to graduate to your advising appointment. These are available from the main Political Science office. Your advisor will discuss with you whether you meet the requirements to graduate and, if appropriate, will sign the form. You then must take this form to 200 [[Clark Hall|http://tour.ua.edu/tourstops/clark.html]]. The Registrar will audit your transcript and will notify you whether you can graduate at the end of the next semester.
''Invited talks:''
{{indent{Texas A&M University (2003)
{{indent{Louisiana State University (2003)
{{indent{Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland (2004)
{{indent{[[Ohio State University|https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/1811/31805/3/Douglas%20Gibler%205-23-05.pdf]] (2005)
{{indent{Columbia University (2005)
{{indent{[[University of Iowa|http://www.saramitchell.org/shambaugh06.html]] (2006)
{{indent{[[University of Chicago|http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/Programs/beyond/workshops/pipes.asp]] (2008)
{{indent{[[University of Texas, LBJ School|http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/calendar/event/2218/]] (2009)
Editorial Board Member, International Interactions, 2008-2012.
Correlates of War Project Member, 1997-present.
Graduate Student Paper Award Committee, Southern Political Science Association, 2009
Graduate Student Paper Award Committee, International Studies Association, 2002-2004.
Graduate Student Paper Award Committee, Southern Political Science Association, 2009
Reviewer for the following grantors, publishers and journals: National Science Foundation, University of Chicago Press, Oxford University Press, Stanford University Press, Congressional Quarterly Publishers, Pearson Longman, Routledge Press, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Conflict Management and Peace Science, European Journal of International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Interactions, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Politics, Peace and Change, Security Studies, and World Politics.
In an article I have in the current //Journal of Politics//, I note that the scholarly literature has generally concluded that US economic aid has little effect abroad. However, this conclusion had been reached without considering all the effects of US aid. For example, foreign aid research has tended to focus on the level of aid given to states and the changes in human rights that were made by these states over time. While interesting, this fails to recognize where the prospects of aid should matter most - in those states that should receive aid but do not because of their domestic human rights policies. To demonstrate this point, I conduct a Heckman selection analysis, specifying whether a state receives aid and the amount of aid as the two dependent variables. I then use conditional probabilities from this two-stage model as a predictor of changes in human rights policies. I find support for the opportunity cost argument since the conditional probabilities predict policy changes much better than actual aid received.
As a follow-up to the initial argument described above, I am currently finishing a manuscript that first confirms my previous findings with an alternate measure of repression (the Political Terror Scale), and then correlates lost US economic aid with lost US military aid. Interestingly, the correlation between lost economic aid and military aid is negative - in other words, the United States often replaces economic aid lost due to repression with military aid from other programs. Controlling for this replacement effect, the connection between opportunity costs and institutional change is even stronger.
Another manuscript I am currently working on uses the same opportunity cost logic, but this time applies that logic to a cross-country study of changes in the institutions protecting property rights. The argument is straightforward: those countries that have lost the most investment dollars due to poor property rights protections are also the countries most likely to change their institutions to attract future dollars. To test the argument, I first model the structural features affecting foreign direct investment, calculating the probable monies lost due to poor protections. I then use these probabilities to predict institutional changes. The results are strong, consistent, and robust to several different model specifications, and the theory itself provides a useful way of thinking about why certain countries are more likely to democratize, or at least change their economic institutions. I am co-authoring this manuscript with another former graduate student.
!Working Papers
Forthcoming. [[Coup-Proofing while Democratizing: The United States Professional Military Education of Foreign Officers, 1950-1999]]. European Journal of International Relations. (with Lt. Col. Tomislav Z. Ruby)
Working Paper. [[Opportunities Lost: Complex Institutional Change to Attract FDI.]] (with Trish Gibson)
Working Paper. [[When Will Leaders Respond?: The Tensions between US Economic and Military Aid.]]
!Publications
2008. [[United States Economic Aid and Repression: The Opportunity Cost Argument.]] The Journal of Politics. Vol 70: 2 (April), pp. 513-526.
''Abstract:'' This article describes a simulation I often use in my American Foreign Policy classes. The simulation is designed to give students a better understanding of the international constraints placed upon U.S. policymakers when crafting the foreign policy agenda. Students role-play various country leaders and other international actors and attempt to bargain and place pressures on the U.S. in order to alter both the content and saliency of items on the foreign policy agenda. The simulation represents an effective “active learning” technique that has proven to be quite useful at getting students involved in the class material while teaching both effective research and communication skills. Additional benefits include the relatively little preparation and maintenance time required of the instructor, the modest amount of classroom time that must be dedicated to the simulation, and the adaptability of the simulation to alternative learning goals. I outline the simulation here in the hope that other international relations teachers can use it effectively in their American Foreign Policy, Introduction to International Relations, and other related classes.
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=ps&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]]
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 2004. International Constraints and the United States Foreign Policy Agenda: A ~Semester-Long Class Simulation using the Blackboard Web Platform. PS: Political Science & Politics (July): 1-4.
''From the Introduction:'' These two volumes compile and describe in detail every interstate formal alliance signed since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. There are more than 450 alliances from 1648 to the present that meet the criteria of formal interstate alliances, and for each case commentary is provided in the form of several paragraphs on the background and history surrounding the formation of the alliance as well as, in some cases, the effects of the alliance on the region or international system. In addition, commentary often notes when states joined or left an alliance and when (or if) the alliance was abrogated. This detailed commentary supports the actual text of the alliance, if available in English, or an English translation of key alliance terms if no English text is available.
[[Book Website|http://www.cqpress.com/product/International-Military-Alliances-2.html]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 2009. International Military Alliances from 1648 to 2008. Volumes I and II. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
[ISBN 978-1568028248]
Much of my published research to date analyzes the effects of international alliances on conflict. My current work in this research program argues that two variables - the relative tightness (shared policy similarity) of an alliance and the overall capability distribution within the alliance - control whether an alliance is likely to be used for aggressive purposes, to pacify an issue, or to deter likely threats. The findings from my theory are consistent and robust, explaining when alliances will form, their duration, reliability, and their effects on conflict onset and expansion. The dataset I developed for this project is available from the Correlates of War Project.
I have also recently written two papers that examine separate aspects of alliance formation. The first paper, published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, demonstrates that democracies are not likely to ally with each other. Instead, 90% of the jointly democratic dyads are contained in three large regional alliances, and most of the states in these alliances were not democratic when the alliances were formed. In a second paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, I examine whether alliance reliability affects future alliance formation.
!Working Papers
Working Paper. [[Reconceptualizing alliances: how treaty nesting can fundamentally change the meaning of a concept]] (with Gary Goertz and Kathy Powers).
Working Paper. [[A General Theory of Alliances: Explaining Formation, Reliability, War, and War Expansion.]]
!Publications
2009. [[International Military Alliances from 1648 to 2008.]] Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
2008. [[Alliances.]] In Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Volume II, edited by L. Kurtz and J. Turpin. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
2008. [[The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation.]] Journal of Conflict Resolution.
2006. [[External Threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited.]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 43: 4 (July), 413-431. (and Jamil Sewell).
2006. [[Alliances, then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship between Regime Type and Alliance Formation.]] Journal of Conflict Resolution. February: Volume (50): 129-153. (and Scott Wolford)
2004. [[Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests versus Capabilities in Alliance Behavior.]] International Interactions. Volume 30 (4), pp. 309-330 (and Toby Rider).
2004. [[Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000.]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 41: 2, pp. 211-222.
2002. [[The Steps to War in Asia, 1931-45.]] Security Studies. Volume 10: 3, pp. 1-45.
1999. [[An Extension of the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Data Set, 1648-1814.]] International Interactions. Volume 25: 1, pp. 1-28.
1999. [[East or Further East?]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 36: 6, pp. 627-637.
1998. [[Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980.]] International Studies Quarterly. 42 (4) 785-807. (and John A. Vasquez).
1997. [[Control the Issues, Control the Conflict: The Effects of Alliances that Settle Territorial Issues on Interstate Rivalries.]] International Interactions. 22 (4):341-68.
1996. [[Alliances that Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty.]] Conflict Management and Peace Science. 16 (1):75-97.
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[[About Me]]
[[Contact Info]]
[[About this Website]]
''Research''
[[Territorial Threat]]
[[Interstate Alliances]]
[[Arms Races]]
[[Institutional Change]]
[[Peace Treaties]]
[[Working Papers]]
[[Replication Data|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/replication.html]]
''Teaching''
[[Belgium Program]]
[[Current Classes]]
[[Previous Classes]]
[[Upcoming Classes]]
[[Evaluations]]
[[Philosophy, etc]]
''Advising''
[[Advising Info]]
[[Office Hours]]
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''Abstract:'' This article serves as a companion to the release of Version 3.0 of the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000. First released in 1966, the Correlates of War alliance data have greatly influenced quantitative studies of conflict, providing an important variable in the study of international conflict and cooperation. The article begins by describing the historical development and the major characteristics of the alliance dataset. The second section then discusses the procedures used to both identify and code each alliance in this revised and extended version of the data, and this is followed by a description of several important changes made to the original coding rules in order to develop this dataset, with the most notable of these changes being a more determined reliance on treaty texts rather than historical accounts for identification of alliances and alliance types. To show the effects of the revised coding decisions and the enlarged temporal domain, the final section of the article presents summary statistics for the new data and then uses the dataset to revisit two existing studies on democracy and alliance behavior. The findings indicate that jointly democratic dyads are likely to be allied only after 1945; joint democracy is negatively related to alliance formation during the 1816-1944 time period.
[[Web Appendix I|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/replication/v3appendixI.pdf]]. [[Web Appendix II|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/replication/v3appendixII.PDF]]. [[Web Appendix III|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/replication/v3appendixIII.pdf]].
''NOTE:'' For summaries of each alliance in the dataset that also include the full text of all English language treaties, see [[my new book|International Military Alliances from 1648 to 2008.]] that is now available from CQ Press.
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler+sarkees&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]]
''Replication Data:''
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2004. Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000. Journal of Peace Research. Volume 41: 2, pp. 211-222.
''Blatant self-promotional factoid:'' This was the 3rd most cited article in Armed Conflict studies from 2004 to 2006, according to Thompson Scientific's Essential Science Indicators. See the press release [[here|http://www.as.ua.edu/psc/news/post.php?p=4]].
My office is 317 ten Hoor Hall, which can be located on this [[campus map| http://tour.ua.edu/tourstops/tenhoor.html]].
I'm not teaching during the Spring 2009 semester, so I will not be holding regular office hours. However, if you really need to reach me, then send me an [[email|mailto:doug.gibler@gmail.com ]].
''Abstract:'' I use this paper to examine the effects of external threat on state centralization, in a time period (1945 to 1999) and sample (all system members, democratic and non-democratic) not generally associated with the threat-to-state-making hypotheses. My findings support the idea that only direct territorial threat is capable of initiating the processes that lead states to militarize and centralize; this provides domestic-level evidence for the international salience of territorial issues. I also demonstrate that the effects of centralization are more pronounced in targeted states, which suggests that fears of elite manipulation of external threats may be generally overblown. In all, and using six separate measures of institutional and behavioral centralization, my results demonstrate that territorial issues and regional democracy are the strongest substantive predictors of state centralization. I discuss the implications of these findings for several different literatures.
''Status:'' Currently under revision for resubmission.
''Availability:'' [[Latest version|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/OutsideIn.Gibler.102008.pdf]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 2008. Outside In: The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization. Working Paper. University of Alabama.
''Conferences presented:'' International Studies Association Meeting (March, 2007)
''Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Alabama, 2006-present.''
{{indent{Courses Taught: [Undergraduate:] International Relations, International Conflict, American Foreign Policy, {{indent{and Democratization, [Graduate:] International Conflict.
''Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky, 2005-2006.''
''Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky, 1999-2005.''
{{indent{Courses Taught: [Undergraduate:] World Politics, Causes of War, American Foreign Policy, and Research Methods, {{indent{[Graduate:] Theories of International Conflict and Cooperation, Theories of International Politics Proseminar, and Statistics.
''Lecturer in International Policy Studies, Stanford University, 1998-1999''
{{indent{Courses Taught: [Graduate:] Theories of International Conflict and Cooperation, Research Seminar on the Causes of {{indent{War, International Organization, and American Foreign Policy.
''Visiting Assistant Prof. of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, 1997-1998''
{{indent{Courses Taught: Introduction to International Relations, Causes of War, American Foreign Policy, International Law {{indent{and Organization, and American Government.
''BOOKS:''
2009. [[International Military Alliances from 1648 to 2008.]] Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. [ISBN 978-1568028248]
[[Bordering on Peace]]: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict. (Book manuscript in progress)
''REFEREED JOURNAL ARTICLES:''
Forthcoming. [[Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers]] American Journal of Political Science (with Jaroslav Tir)
Forthcoming. [[Outside-In: The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization]] Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Forthcoming. [[Democracies, Territory and Negotiated Compromises.]] Conflict Management and Peace Science. (with Steven V. Miller).
Forthcoming. [[Coup-Proofing while Democratizing: The United States Professional Military Education of Foreign Officers, 1950-1999]]. European Journal of International Relations. (with Tomislav Ruby)
2008. [[The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation.]] Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 52: 3 (June), pp. 426-454.
2008. [[United States Economic Aid and Repression: The Opportunity Cost Argument.]] The Journal of Politics. Vol 70: 2 (April), pp. 513-526.
2007. [[Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict.]] International Studies Quarterly. Vol 51: 3 (September), pp. 509-532.
2007. [[Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat: A Cross-National Study.]] The Journal of Politics. Vol 69: 1 (February), 128-142. (with Marc Hutchison)
2006. [[External Threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited.]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 43: 4 (July), 413-431. (with Jamil Sewell)
2006. [[Alliances, then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship between Regime Type and Alliance Formation.]] Journal of Conflict Resolution. Volume 50: 1 (February), 1-25. (with Scott Wolford)
2005. [[Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Interdependent Racing and the Likelihood of Conflict in Rival States.]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 42: 2, pp. 131-147. (with Toby Rider and Marc Hutchison)
2004. [[Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests versus Capabilities in Alliance Behavior.]] International Interactions. Volume 30 (4), pp. 309-330. (with Toby Rider)
2004. [[Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000.]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 41: 2, pp. 211-222. [Note: This is the 3rd most cited article in Armed Conflict studies from 2004 to 2006, according to Thompson Scientific's Essential Science Indicators.] (with Meredith Reid Sarkees)
2002. [[The Steps to War in Asia, 1931-45.]] Security Studies. Volume 10: 3, pp. 1-45. (with John Vasquez)
1999. [[An Extension of the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Data Set, 1648-1814.]] International Interactions. Volume 25: 1, pp. 1-28.
1999. [[East or Further East?]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 36: 6, pp. 627-637.
1998. [[Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980.]] International Studies Quarterly. Volume 42: 4, pp. 785-807. [Reprinted in War (Sage Library of International Relations), edited by P. F. Diehl. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005.] (with John Vasquez)
1997. [[Control the Issues, Control the Conflict: The Effects of Alliances that Settle Territorial Issues on Interstate Rivalries.]] International Interactions. Volume 22: 4, pp. 341-68.
1996. [[Alliances that Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty.]] Conflict Management and Peace Science. Volume 16: 1, pp. 75-97. [Reprinted in A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict, edited by P. F. Diehl. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999: 181-204.]
''BOOK CHAPTERS AND OTHER RESEARCH ORIENTED PUBLICATIONS:''
2008. [[Alliances.]] In Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Volume II, edited by L. Kurtz and J. Turpin. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
2001. Defending Against the Indefensible: Creating a National Missile Defense. In History behind the headlines: the origins of conflicts worldwide, Volume 4, edited by S. Benson. Farmington Hills, Mi: Thomson Gale Group.
2000. [[Alliances: Why Some Cause War and Why Others Cause Peace.]] In What do we know about war?, edited by J. A. Vasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield: 145-164.
1999. Alliance Systems. In Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, edited by L. Kurtz and J. Turpin. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, Inc.: 47-54.
''REFEREED, TEACHING ORIENTED JOURNAL ARTICLES:''
2004. [[International Constraints and the United States Foreign Policy Agenda: A Semester-Long Class Simulation using the Blackboard Web Platform.]] PS: Political Science & Politics (July): 1-4.
2002/03. [[Educating Foreign Officers]]. Joint Force Quarterly. 33 (Winter): 119-123. (with Tomislav Z. Ruby)
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Together with my good friend and colleague at Alabama, [[Karl DeRouen|http://www.as.ua.edu/psc/faculty_and_staff/faculty_directory/derouen/index.php]], I am beginning an extensive data collection effort on the resolution of Militarized Interstate Disputes (~MIDs). We are collecting information on all negotiated settlements, including roughly 30 variables directly coded from all treaties that formally end the disputes. This project is an outgrowth of my early interest in territorial settlement treaties and complements some of my recent research on positive territorial peace.
!Working Papers
Working Paper. [[Does Force or Agreement Lead to Peace?: A Collection and Analysis of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Settlement, 1816 to 2001]]. (with Karl ~DeRouen, Jr.).
Working Paper. [[Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers]] (with Jaroslav Tir)
!Publications
1997. [[Control the Issues, Control the Conflict: The Effects of Alliances that Settle Territorial Issues on Interstate Rivalries.]] International Interactions. 22 (4):341-68.
1996. [[Alliances that Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty.]] Conflict Management and Peace Science. 16 (1):75-97.
''Abstract:'' I argue that transnational regime diffusion is best understood as a result of the status of international borders – autocracy and democracy are likely to spread across, respectively, unstable and stable borders. I test the autocracy portion of our theory by considering the effects of serious regime challenges, thereby linking observations of democratic contagion to anomalies found in the arms race literature. I find that arms races during the Cold War produced conflict short of war, undercutting the leadership of neighboring regimes. States targeted by arms races suffered more coups d’etat and more intrastate wars; targeted states were also unlikely to undergo democratic transitions. Diffusion theories based upon the democratic peace cannot explain these serious regime challenges.
''Status:'' In progress.
''Availability:'' Please email me for a copy.
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. Working Paper. Peaceful Arms Races?: The Non-traditional Arms Race of Insurgency and Terrorism
''Conferences presented:'' This paper will be presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting (April, 2008) in Chicago, IL as a joint paper with Andy Akin, a graduate student at the University of Alabama.
Here are a few links that provide some background information about my teaching. For example, you can view the [[teaching philosophy]] statement I wrote for my recent tenure review. Or, you can follow [[this link|http://giblersclasses.blogspot.com/]] to a blog I use to communicate with students in my current and previous classes. I have also written a couple of pedagogical pieces, one of which described [[a simulation|International Constraints and the United States Foreign Policy Agenda: A Semester-Long Class Simulation using the Blackboard Web Platform.]] I use in my American Foreign Policy class. The article appeared in the journal PS.
If you're interested in seeing student evaluation data for my classes, you can view the [[UA teaching evaluation summary data]] or the data from my [[UK teaching evaluations]]. You can also always scan the earlier data directly from the University of Kentucky's website, which is posted [[here| http://www.uky.edu/IR/tce.html]]. Unfortunately, UA does not release this data to the public.
''Abstract:''
This paper argues that territorial dispute initiation is driven by political entrepreneurs who use territorial issues to advance their domestic political agendas. By politicizing international territorial disputes, these territorial entrepreneurs are able to rally political support among selected groups in the country with the intention of using that support to gain domestic power. Tests examining the effects of ethnic heterogeneity, income inequality, and the domestic political strength of the military provide strong support for the theory. Moreover, the addition of several variables measuring the likely effectiveness of political entrepreneurs eliminates the predictive power of regime type and per capita wealth on territorial dispute initiation.
''Status:'' [[Working Paper|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Gibler.Entrepreneurs.pdf]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 2009. Political Entrepreneurs and the Sources of Territorial Dispute Initiation. Working Paper. University of Alabama.
''Conferences presented:'' Presented at the Western Political Science Association Meeting in March, 2009.
''Abstract:'' The ~Steps-to-War theory of international conflict argues that territorial issues are more salient than other issues domestically. However, the evidence for this conclusion almost always rests with international conflict outcomes, assuming away the domestic political processes leading to greater salience. In the tolerance literature, several studies note that political attitudes, particularly toward unpopular groups, vary systematically across different states but provide few explanations that account for these differences. We believe these two observations are linked and argue that territorial threats serve as one factor conditioning individual political attitudes that privilege national unity over freedom of expression. Using World Values Survey data collected from 33 countries, and Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) techniques, our paper confirms this. We find evidence that the type of external threat facing a country matters in moderating individual attitudes, even after controlling for economic and institutional differences across the states sampled. Specifically, we demonstrate how the diffusion from territorial threats to domestic audiences results in a chilling effect on individual willingness to extend democratic freedoms. Thus, we show that territorial issues exhibit greater salience domestically than other types of international issues.
[[Web Appendix|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/WebAppendix.mlhdmg.032006..pdf]]
[[Google Scholar| http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler+hutchison&as_publication=&as_ylo=2007&as_yhi=2007&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
[[Replication Data|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/HutchisonGibler2007.ReplicationData.zip]] (in a .zip file).
''Citation:'' Marc Hutchison and Douglas M. Gibler. 2007. Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat: A ~Cross-National Study. The Journal of Politics. Vol 69: 1 (February), 128-142.
''Co-author info:'' [[Marc Hutchison|http://www.uri.edu/artsci/psc/index.php?id=47&fromtable=Page]] was one of my graduate students at the University of Kentucky. He is now an Assistant Professor at the University of Rhode Island.
Authors are listed in (reverse) alphabetical order.
//Here is a sample list of classes that I have taught over the past few years. Available links will take you to the syllabus or website for the course.//
!UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
| |''Fall 2009:'' |[[PSC 442 International Conflict]]|
| |''Summer 2009: ''|[[Belgium Program - PSC442 International Conflict|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/public_html/syllabi/PSC442.syllabus.Belgium.2009.pdf]]|
| |''Interim 2009: '' |[[PSC321 Conflict and the Middle East|http://dl.getdropbox.com/u/48922/PSC321.Interim.2009.syllabus.pdf]]|
| |''Fall 2008:'' |[[PSC 413 American Foreign Policy|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/Psc413.Syllabus.Fall.2008.pdf]] |
|~|~|>|[[PSC 204 International Relations|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/Psc204syllabusFall2008.pdf]]|
| |''Summer 2008:'' |[[PSC 413 American Foreign Policy|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/Psc413%20syllabus%20Summer%202008.pdf]] |
|~|~|>|[[PSC 204 International Relations|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/Psc204%20syllabus%20Summer%202008.pdf]]|
| |''Interim 2008:'' |[[PSC 321 Conflict and Democracy in the Middle East|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/Interim.2008.Syllabus.Gibler.pdf]] |
| |''Spring 2008:'' |[[PSC442 International Conflict|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/PSC442.Spring2008.pdf]]|
| |''Fall 2007:'' | [[PSC641 International Conflict and Democratization|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/Psc641Fall2007.pdf]] (graduate)|
| |''Spring 2007:'' |[[PSC413 American Foreign Policy|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/PS413.AFP.Spring2007.pdf]] |
|~|~|>|[[PSC644 International Conflict|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/PS644.Conflict.Spring2007.pdf]] (graduate)|
| |''Fall 2006:''|[[PSC321 International Conflict and Democratization|http://giblersclasses.blogspot.com/search/label/PS321%20Democratization]]|
|~|~|>|[[PSC442 International Conflict|http://giblersclasses.blogspot.com/search/label/PS442%20International%20Conflict]]|
| |''Summer 2006:''|~PSC204 International Relations|
!UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
| |''Summer 2006:'' |[[World Politics|http://www.uky.edu/~dgibler/WPSummer2006.htm]]|
| |''Spring 2006:'' |[[World Politics|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/WPSpring2006.htm]]|
|~|~|>|[[International Relations Prosem|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/PS674Spring2006.htm]] (Graduate)|
| |''Fall 2005:'' |[[World Politics|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/WPFall2005.htm]]|
|~|~|>|[[American Foreign Policy|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/AFPFall2005.htm]]|
| |''Summer 2005:'' |[[World Politics|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/WP2005summer.htm]]|
| |''Spring 2005:'' |[[World Politics|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/WP2005.htm]]|
|~|~|>|[[Theories of International Conflict|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/conflict2005.htm]] (Graduate)|
| |''Fall 2004:'' |[[Causes of War|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/CoW2004.htm]]|
|~|~|>|[[Introduction to Statistics|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/Stats2004.htm]] (Graduate)|
| |''Spring 2004:'' |International Relations Prosem (Graduate)|
| |''Fall 2003:'' |[[World Politics|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/fall2003.htm]]|
|~|~|>|[[American Foreign Policy|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/fall2003.htm]]|
''Abstract:'' The trade-off model of alliances offers a theory of alliance formation and duration that has significantly advanced our understanding of why states enter into alliances and why these alliances persist. However, we argue that extant tests of this model are improperly specified, greatly reducing the overall usefulness of the trade-off theory, and we therefore use this paper to bring foreign policy interests back into the model. Specifically, we argue that dyadic interest similarity best captures the motivations behind alliance formation and termination, and together with capability concentration, accurately predicts when dyads will seek alliances and what types of alliances are likely to be formed. We test our theory using a greatly expanded temporal domain (1648–2000), and our results are consistent and robust across each model. [[Web Appendix|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/webappII.pdf]].
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler+rider&as_publication=international+interactions&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Citation:'' DM Gibler & TR Rider. 2004. Prior Commitments: Compatible Interests versus Capabilities in Alliance Behavior. International Interactions. Volume 30 (4): 309-330.
''Co-author info:'' [[Toby Rider|https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/trider2/www/]] was one of my graduate students at the University of Kentucky. He is now a graduate student at the University of Illinois.
''2009''
''Western Political Science Association'', Vancouver, BC (Canada) (March). [[Political Entrepreneurs and the Sources of Territorial Dispute Initiation.]]
''International Studies Association'', New York, NY (February). [[Regional Democracy and Peaceful Borders: Assessing the Relationship between Conflict and Democracy in the Region]] (with Alex Braithwaite).
''Southern Political Science Association'', New Orleans, LA (Janaury), [[The Independent Judiciary and Democratic Backsliding]] (with Joe Walsh)
''2008''
''Peace Science Society (International)'', Claremont, CA (October), [[Regional Democracy and Peaceful Borders: Assessing the Relationship between Conflict and Democracy in the Region]] (with Alex Braithwaite)
''American Political Science Association'', Boston, MA (August), [[Reconceptualizing alliances: how treaty nesting can fundamentally change the meaning of a concept]] (with Gary Goertz and Kathy Powers)
''Midwest Political Science Association'', Chicago, IL (April), [[Territorial Threats, Civil Wars, and Identity Formation.]] (with Marc Hutchison and Steven Miller)
''International Studies Association'', San Francisco, CA (March), [[Territorial Threats, Civil Wars, and Identity Formation.]] (with Marc Hutchison and Steven Miller)
''2007''
''~Pan-European Conference on International Relations'', Torino, Italy (September 11-15, 2007), [[Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers]] (with Jaroslav Tir).
''International Studies Association'', Chicago, IL (March), [[Outside-In The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization]]
''2006''
''Peace Science Society (International)'', Columbus, OH (November), //Dangerous Democratizers?: New Democracies and the Likelihood of Conflict//
''International Studies Association (South)'', Birmingham, AL (November), Discussant
''American Political Science Association'', Philadelphia, PA (September), Discussant
''International Studies Association'', San Diego, CA (March), //The Steps to Interstate War in Africa// (with Brandon Valeriano)
''2005''
''American Political Science Association'', Washington, DC (September), //Coding Alliances: Issues Related to State Commitments and Treaty Termination in the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset//
''Midwest Political Science Association'', Chicago, IL (April), //Perceiving the Need to Change: The Role of Perception in Explaining the Effects of US Foreign Economic Assistance in Limiting Human Rights Abuses// (with Amanda Cooper)
''Midwest Political Science Association'', Chicago, IL (April), //Why Territory Matters: The Effects of External Threat on Domestic Political Tolerance// (with Marc Hutchison)
''International Studies Association'', Honolulu, HI (March), //Why Territory Matters: The Effects of External Threat on Domestic Political Tolerance// (with Marc Hutchison)
''International Studies Association'', Honolulu, HI (March), //The Geography of Conflict: Factors Promoting the Onset of Territorial Claims and Disputes// (with Toby Rider)
''International Studies Association'', Honolulu, HI (March), Discussant and Chairperson
''2004''
''American Political Science Association'', Chicago, IL (September), //Know Thy Enemy: Identifying Threats in Alliance Politics//
''Midwest Political Science Association'', Chicago, IL (April), Discussant
''International Studies Association'', Montreal, Quebec (March), //Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict// (with Scott Wolford)
''International Studies Association'', Montreal, Quebec (March), //Arming against a Sea of Trouble: Interdependent Racing and the Likelihood of Conflict in Rival States (with Toby Rider and Marc Hutchison)
''Project Summary:'' The history and theory of alliances is intimately interwoven with realism as an approach to international relations. In this proposal we argue that the concept, operationalization, data, and theories of alliances are all in need of reconceptualization. The standard thinking about alliances is not so much wrong as radically incomplete. Re‹search and theories only consider military alliances as realist tools for balancing and controlling power. We argue instead that most alliances function, at least in some aspects, as tools for conflict management among the alliance partners. Such alliance treaties include traditional, realist alliance obligations (e.g. mutual defense, non-aggression and consultation) as well as other institutional mechanisms to more directly manage ongoing conflicts and conflicts including non-state actors. Conflict management alliances include these obligations plus mechanisms such as: 1) military forces that serve peacekeeping and humanitarian functions, 2) mechanisms to monitor peace and alert conflict on the ground, 3) various dispute resolution mechanisms to mitigate intra-alliance member conflict and 4) post-conflict resolution mechanisms to prevent the resurgence of intrastate and interstate conflict involving allies (Powers and Goertz 2007).
The purpose of this project, then, is to reconceptualize alliances to include the contextual (i.e. nesting) factors that fundamentally determine the meaning of the alliance. Our contribution is twofold: 1) we reconceptualize alliances and 2) we introduce the concept and methodology of nesting as a more appropriate way to characterize and analyze alliance obligations in world politics. This methodology includes both qualitative and quantitative methods of investigation. The project domain covers alliance obligations among states globally from 1816-2007.
We argue that alliances are heterogeneous and nested within other types of treaties. We suggest that reconceptualization of alliances along these dimensions has significant implications for existing theories of alliance creation, change, effects and termination. Two key hypotheses are evaluated in this study: 1) conflict management alliances impact interstate and intrastate conflict different than realist alliances, and 2) nesting is an aspect of institutional design that better determines institutional effects rather than evaluating a single treaty obligation in isolation.
Several products will be produced from this project. First, a comprehensive data set including alliance obligations in all treaty contexts (e.g. alliance treaties, trade agreements, friendship treaties) will be created. This data set will differ from COW and ATOP data sets because it will include all realist and conflict management alliances during the study period as well as alliance obligations embedded in treaties other than alliance treaties. Second, a database composed of the original alliance treaties will also be produced. This repository will allow other scholars to read the original treaty and code new variables or check the reliability of variables created in our data set. Finally, several peer reviewed articles and a book manuscript will be produced. Theoretically, we anticipate that project findings will change how we think about the institutional context of alliances and their role in international politics.
''Status:'' Under review.
''Availability:'' [[Full proposal|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Goertz.Gibler.Powers.012008.pdf]]
''Citation:'' Gary Goertz, Douglas M. Gibler, and Kathy Powers, Working Paper. Reconceptualizing alliances: how treaty nesting can fundamentally change the meaning of a concept.
''Co-author info:'' [[Gary Goertz|http://polisci.web.arizona.edu/faculty/goertz.html]] is a Professor at the University of Arizona; [[Kathy Powers|http://www.unm.edu/~polsci/faculty.htm#powersKathy]] is an Assistant Professor at the University of New Mexico.
''Abstract:'' In this paper we argue that the association between joint democracy and peace is a product of a larger, territorial peace. States in regions with unstable borders must maintain centralized political authority and remain militarized in order to defend their homeland territories. This makes democratic transitions unlikely in regions with high levels of border instability, and thus, democracies are more likely to be found in areas where the probability of territorial conflict is low.
We test the argument using a new dataset of territorial dispute hot spots from 1960 to 1998. These hot spots identify spatial and temporal correlation in the territorial dispute data and therefore serve as close proxies for border instability. The addition of these hot spots to models of conflict also eliminates a common form of omitted variable bias in models of international conflict. Our results confirm that joint democracy is no longer statistically significant as a predictor of fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes (~MIDs), 1960-1998, once territorial hot spots are included in the model. An interaction between joint democracy and historical border instability confirms that the effects of regime type only apply to peaceful regions.
''Status:'' Under review.
''Availability:'' [[Paper|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Gibler.Braithwaite.042009.pdf]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler and Alex Braithwaite. 2009. Regional Democracy and Peaceful Borders: Assessing the Relationship between Conflict and Democracy in the Region. Working Paper. University of Alabama.
''Conferences presented:'' Peace Science Society (October 2008); International Studies Association Meeting (February, 2009)
''Abstract:'' In this study, we build on the research demonstrating that external threats toward a state affect regime type - by causing militarization and centralization of authority - and in particular on the argument that democracy is fostered by the removal of territorial threats between neighboring states. While previous studies note that the resolution of territorial issues promotes domestic decentralization and liberalization, none has directly tested the role of border legitimacy in democratic transitions. We provide precisely such a test by relying on the phenomenon of peaceful state-to-state territorial transfers (i.e. peaceful border adjustment). Peaceful transfers increase cross-border trust and demonstrate a credible commitment regarding territorial dispute resolution. In this sense, peaceful transfers often signify international borders accepted as legitimate. Importantly, our focus is thus on the consequences of positive peace and not simply on the effects of the mere absence of conflict, as is commonly the case in the reverse causality research on the democratic peace. Our findings support the expectations that the settling of territorial issues via peaceful transfers leads to demilitarization, border stability, and, critically, democratic transitions. Our tests also show that regime type has no bearing on the occurrence of peaceful territorial transfers, that is that they are not endogenous to some longterm democratization process. In tandem with some other recent works, our study supports an alternative explanation for the democratic peace: both democracy and peace may be a function of settling the territorial threats.
''Status:'' Invited to revise and resubmit to the //American Journal of Political Science//.
''Availability:'' [[Working Paper|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/tir.gibler.022008.pdf]].
''Citation:'' Jaroslav Tir and Douglas M. Gibler. 2008. Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers. Working Paper. University of Alabama.
''Conferences presented:'' SGIR in Turin, Italy (September, 2007)
''Co-author info:'' [[Jaroslav Tir|http://tir.myweb.uga.edu/]] is an Associate Professor at the University of Georgia. Authorship is in (reverse) alphabetical order.
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2001, Departmental Nominee, Chancellor's Teaching Award, University of Kentucky
1996-1997, Master Teaching Fellow, Social Sciences, Vanderbilt University. (Selected as the Teaching Assistant of the Year in Social Sciences at Vanderbilt. Trained incoming social science teaching assistants in various teaching methods and was responsible for evaluation of their effectiveness in the classroom.)
''Abstract:'' This article revisits the arms race to war relationship with the hope of resolving a lingering debate in international relations over the effects of arms races. Previous empirical studies in this area suffered from a possible selection effect, rendering them unable to differentiate between the escalatory and deterrent effects of arms races. Specifically, earlier quantitative investigations were unable to test deterrence hypotheses, because the unit of analysis (dispute) presupposed that deterrence had already failed in preventing dispute onset. In order to take the possibility of deterrence seriously, a dataset is constructed that identifies arms races independently of dispute occurrence. This article improves on previous studies in that a measure of interdependent arming exogenous to dispute initiation allows for a test of whether arms races actually deter the onset of militarized disputes or contribute to dispute escalation. Both the deterrence and escalation hypotheses are tested using a sample of ‘strategic rivals’ from 1816 to 1993. The analyses reveal that arms races increase the likelihood of disputes and war. Furthermore, to account for the possibility that the arms race to war relationship may be spurious to dyadic hostilities accounting for both arms races and war, a selection model is employed that differentiates between dispute and war processes. This indicates that arms races do not contribute to deterrence and are instead associated with both disputes and war.
[[Google Scholar| http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler+rider+hutchison&as_publication=&as_ylo=&as_yhi=&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
[[Web Appendix|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/replication/Gibler.et.al.2005.WebAppendix.pdf]].
[[Replication Data|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/replication/gibleretaldatset.zip]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler, Toby Rider, and Marc Hutchison. 2005. Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Interdependent Racing and the Likelihood of Conflict in Rival States. Journal of Peace Research. Volume 42: 2, pp. 131-147.
''Co-author info:'' [[Toby Rider|https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/trider2/www/]] was one of my graduate students at the University of Kentucky and is now a graduate student at the University of Illinois. [[Marc Hutchison|http://www.uri.edu/artsci/psc/index.php?id=47&fromtable=Page]] was also one of my graduate students at the University of Kentucky; Marc is now an Assistant Professor at the University of Rhode Island.
Much of my current research focuses on the transnational effects of territorial issues in the development and maintenance of democracy. I argue that a necessary condition for democracy is the removal of territorial threats posed by neighboring states. In the presence of territorial threat, states must maintain large land armies and centralize their regimes to effectively guard against foreign intrusion. These responses hamper the ability of states to transition to democracy, or for states already democratic, the likelihood democracy will endure. Since territorial issues are also the most dangerous type of international issue, their absence is likely to foster peace between states. Thus, the absence of territorial issues accounts for both the development of democracy and the existence of a jointly democratic peace.
!Working Papers
Book manuscript. [[Bordering on Peace]]: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict.
Working Paper. [[Political Entrepreneurs and the Sources of Territorial Dispute Initiation.]]
Working Paper. [[Territorial Threats, Civil Wars, and Identity Formation.]] (with Marc Hutchison and Steve Miller).
Working Paper. [[Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers]] (with Jaroslav Tir).
Working Paper. [[Outside-In The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization]].
Working Paper. [[The Independent Judiciary and Democratic Backsliding]] (with Joseph Walsh)
Working Paper. [[Regional Democracy and Peaceful Borders: Assessing the Relationship between Conflict and Democracy in the Region]] (with Alex Braithwaite)
Working Paper. [[Dangerous Democratizers? New Democracies and the Likelihood of Conflict]] (with John Oneal).
Working Paper. [[Bordering on Democracy: External Threat and the Development of the Liberal State]].
!Publications
2007. [[Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict.]] International Studies Quarterly. Vol 51: 3 (September), pp. 509-532.
2007. [[Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat: A Cross-National Study.]] The Journal of Politics. Vol 69: 1 (February), 128-142. (and Marc Hutchison).
2006. [[External Threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited.]] Journal of Peace Research. Volume 43: 4 (July), 413-431. (and Jamil Sewell).
2006. [[Alliances, then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship between Regime Type and Alliance Formation.]] Journal of Conflict Resolution. Volume 50: 1 (February), 1-25. (and Scott Wolford).
''Abstract:''
Here we present the first cross-national, multi-level analysis of the effects of international and civil conflict on individual identity formation. Using Afrobarometer survey data from over 31,000 respondents in 16 separate sub-Saharan countries, we analyze the effects of several different types of conflict on the likelihood an individual will identify themselves as a member of an ethnic group rather than their nation. We find that international conflict exerts a strong influence on the likelihood and content of individual self-identification, but this effect varies with the type of conflict. International conflict leads individuals in targeted countries to identify themselves as citizens of their country. Individuals in countries initiating territorial disputes, however, are more likely to self-identify as members of a particular ethnic group. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the effect of civil conflict is inconsistent across models. Indeed, civil conflict only matters for individual identity formation when international conflict is fully specified in the multi-level model. That conflict has variegated effects on identity formation suggests the relationship between international conflict and identity formation is not endogenous. Further, the temporal controls we use to test the identity models confirms that self-identification with an ethnic group follows rather than precedes conflict. We discuss the importance of our findings for the international conflict and identity literatures in some detail.
''Status:'' Under revision for an invited resubmission.
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler, Marc Hutchison and Steven Miller. 2008. Territorial Threats, Civil Wars, and Identity Formation. Working Paper. University of Alabama.
''Conferences presented:'' Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting in April, 2008. Also presented at the [[PIPES seminar|http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/Programs/beyond/workshops/pipes.asp]] at the University of Chicago.
''Co-author info:'' [[Marc Hutchison|http://www.uri.edu/artsci/psc/index.php?id=47&fromtable=Page]] was one of my graduate students at the University of Kentucky. He is now an Assistant Professor at the University of Rhode Island. Steve Miller is a graduate student at the University of Alabama.
''Abstract:'' Reputations are supposed to matter. Decision makers consistently refer to reputations for resolve, and international relations theories confirm the value of being able to credibly signal intentions during times of crisis. However, empirical support for the effects of reputation has been lacking. Problems of strategic selection have hampered previous quantitative tests, and the qualitative literature provides scant support for the concept in individual crises. In this article, the author shifts the focus from crisis behavior to alliance commitments and examines the effects that opportunities to uphold previous commitments have on future alliance commitments and conflicts. The results demonstrate that alliance reputations do affect both alliance formation and dispute behavior.
[[Page proofs|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/JCR310003.gibler.pdf]].
[[Web Appendix|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Gibler.JCR.2008.WebAppendix.pdf]].
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=journal+of+conflict+resolution&as_ylo=2008&as_yhi=2008&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
[[Replication Data|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/replication/replication_data_table_1.zip]] (in a .zip file).
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 2008. The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 52: 3 (June), pp. 426-454.
''Abstract:''
We test the efficacy of judicial independence in preventing regime reversals toward authoritarianism. Using a dataset of judicial constraints across 163 different countries (from 1960-2000) and multivariate models that control for wealth, regime history and the political and military crises associated with regime reversals, we find that established independent judiciaries (those courts that have been independent for 4 or more years) prevent regime changes toward authoritarianism across all types of states. Established courts are also capable of thwarting regime collapses in non-democracies. These results provide some of the first large-n evidence confirming the ability of established courts to maintain regime stability. Unfortunately, however, the beneficial effects of court systems seem to take time. We also find that newly formed courts are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and non-democracies. We discuss the implications of these variegated effects toward the end of the paper.
''Status:'' [[Working Paper|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Gibler.Walsh.SPSA.2009.pdf]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler and Joseph Walsh. 2008. The Independent Judiciary and Democratic Backsliding. Working Paper. University of Alabama.
''Conferences presented:'' Presented at the Southern Political Science Association Meeting in January 2009.
''Co-author info:'' [[Joe Walsh|http://bama.ua.edu/~jtwalsH]] is a graduate student at the University of Alabama.
''Abstract:'' For some time now, there has been a movement among international relations specialists to bring the study of history back into the discipline. Nowhere has this movement had a greater impact than in the study of war. Even quantitatively-oriented scholars have felt that general theories based on empirical findings must be able to explain and enrich our understanding of specific wars if those investigations are to be taken seriously. This analysis seeks to apply a relatively new explanation of war to a specific case to see if that framework can explain the onset of a war of major importance and show how and in what ways it fits a general pattern.
This case study focuses on explaining the onset of World War II in the Pacific and showing how the path to war traversed in this war is the typical path by which world wars come about. World War II, unlike World War I, has not been extensively studied by political scientists. While World War II in Europe can be explained by existing theories, like Organski and Kugler's power transition or Gilpin's theory of hegemonic stability, World War II in the Pacific is not so easily explained, because Japan was so much weaker than the United States. In both of these theories, world wars are explained in terms of a rise in the power of a challenger that approaches the capability of the strongest state in the system. Japan's power, although increasing from 1904-1905, never approaches that of the U.S. Indeed, most theoretical attention on the war in the Pacific has focused on either why such a weak country initiated war against a stronger opponent (let alone the strongest economic power in the world) or on why the deterrence of such a stronger country failed. There have not been many attempts to give a full theoretical explanation of this war, although there have been attempts to explain specific aspects of it. Of course, a comprehensive explanation of the world war would require applying the general explanation to both the European and Pacific theaters. Elsewhere, Vasquez has explained the steps to war in Europe, 1933 to 1941 using the general explanation applied herein. Thus, this study can be seen as a companion piece to the earlier one. While space requirements are an important reason for separating the two theaters, there are also important historical and theoretical reasons for keeping the analyses separate; namely, that the immediate origins of the two wars are independent.
[[Off-print|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/2001.Sec Stud.Vasquez and Gibler.pdf]]
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=steps+to+war+in+asia&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler+vasquez&as_publication=&as_ylo=2000&as_yhi=2002&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Citation:'' John Vasquez and Douglas M. Gibler. 2002. The Steps to War in Asia, 1931-45. Security Studies. Volume 10: 3, pp. 1-45.
''Co-author info:'' [[John Vasquez|http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/people/faculty/members/Vasquez.html]] was my dissertation advisor at Vanderbilt University. John is now at the University of Illinois. Authorship is in (reverse) alphabetical order.
/***
Contains the stuff you need to use Tiddlyspot
Note you must also have UploadPlugin installed
***/
//{{{
// edit this if you are migrating sites or retrofitting an existing TW
config.tiddlyspotSiteId = 'dmg';
// make it so you can by default see edit controls via http
config.options.chkHttpReadOnly = false;
window.readOnly = false; // make sure of it (for tw 2.2)
// disable autosave in d3
if (window.location.protocol != "file:")
config.options.chkGTDLazyAutoSave = false;
// tweak shadow tiddlers to add upload button, password entry box etc
with (config.shadowTiddlers) {
SiteUrl = 'http://'+config.tiddlyspotSiteId+'.tiddlyspot.com';
SideBarOptions = SideBarOptions.replace(/(<<saveChanges>>)/,"$1<<tiddler TspotSidebar>>");
OptionsPanel = OptionsPanel.replace(/^/,"<<tiddler TspotOptions>>");
DefaultTiddlers = DefaultTiddlers.replace(/^/,"[[WelcomeToTiddlyspot]] ");
MainMenu = MainMenu.replace(/^/,"[[WelcomeToTiddlyspot]] ");
}
// create some shadow tiddler content
merge(config.shadowTiddlers,{
'WelcomeToTiddlyspot':[
"This document is a ~TiddlyWiki from tiddlyspot.com. A ~TiddlyWiki is an electronic notebook that is great for managing todo lists, personal information, and all sorts of things.",
"",
"@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //What now?// @@ Before you can save any changes, you need to enter your password in the form below. Then configure privacy and other site settings at your [[control panel|http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/controlpanel]] (your control panel username is //" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + "//).",
"<<tiddler TspotControls>>",
"See also GettingStarted.",
"",
"@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //Working online// @@ You can edit this ~TiddlyWiki right now, and save your changes using the \"save to web\" button in the column on the right.",
"",
"@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //Working offline// @@ A fully functioning copy of this ~TiddlyWiki can be saved onto your hard drive or USB stick. You can make changes and save them locally without being connected to the Internet. When you're ready to sync up again, just click \"upload\" and your ~TiddlyWiki will be saved back to tiddlyspot.com.",
"",
"@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //Help!// @@ Find out more about ~TiddlyWiki at [[TiddlyWiki.com|http://tiddlywiki.com]]. Also visit [[TiddlyWiki Guides|http://tiddlywikiguides.org]] for documentation on learning and using ~TiddlyWiki. New users are especially welcome on the [[TiddlyWiki mailing list|http://groups.google.com/group/TiddlyWiki]], which is an excellent place to ask questions and get help. If you have a tiddlyspot related problem email [[tiddlyspot support|mailto:support@tiddlyspot.com]].",
"",
"@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //Enjoy :)// @@ We hope you like using your tiddlyspot.com site. Please email [[feedback@tiddlyspot.com|mailto:feedback@tiddlyspot.com]] with any comments or suggestions."
].join("\n"),
'TspotControls':[
"| tiddlyspot password:|<<option pasUploadPassword>>|",
"| site management:|<<upload http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi index.html . . " + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ">>//(requires tiddlyspot password)//<<br>>[[control panel|http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/controlpanel]], [[download (go offline)|http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/download]]|",
"| links:|[[tiddlyspot.com|http://tiddlyspot.com/]], [[FAQs|http://faq.tiddlyspot.com/]], [[announcements|http://announce.tiddlyspot.com/]], [[blog|http://tiddlyspot.com/blog/]], email [[support|mailto:support@tiddlyspot.com]] & [[feedback|mailto:feedback@tiddlyspot.com]], [[donate|http://tiddlyspot.com/?page=donate]]|"
].join("\n"),
'TspotSidebar':[
"<<upload http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi index.html . . " + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ">><html><a href='http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/download' class='button'>download</a></html>"
].join("\n"),
'TspotOptions':[
"tiddlyspot password:",
"<<option pasUploadPassword>>",
""
].join("\n")
});
//}}}
''Here is a summary presentation of student evaluation data for my courses at UA.''
You must have Adobe Acrobat to view the embedded file.
<html>
<iframe src="http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/syllabi/UA.evalsummary.pdf" width=900 height=540">
</iframe>
</html>
I taught these classes at the University of Kentucky. The raw data for this form can be found at:
http://www.uky.edu/IR/tce.html
|Semester |Year |Class # |Title of Course | Enrollment | Evaluation|
|Fall |1999 |~PS235 |World Politics |44 | 3.7|
|Spring| 2000 |~PS235 |World Politics |36 |3.7|
|Spring |2001 |~PS235| World Politics (Web) |25|N/A|
|Spring |2002 |~PS235 |World Politics (Web) |25 |N/A|
|Spring|2003 |~PS235 |World Politics |75 | 3.6|
|Fall| 2003 |~PS235 |World Politics |141 |3.4|
|Spring |2005 |~PS235 |World Politics |135 |3.3|
|Spring |2002 |~PS245 |Political Analysis (Web) |25|N/A|
|Spring |2003 |~PS420g |Politics of South Asia |47 |3.4|
|Fall |1999 |~PS430g |American Foreign Policy |50 |3.6|
|Fall |2000 |~PS430g |American Foreign Policy |47 |3.8|
|Fall |2002 |~PS430g |American Foreign Policy |48 |3.6|
|Fall |2003 |~PS430g |American Foreign Policy |55 |3.3|
|Spring| 2000 |~PS491/711 |Causes of War |36 |3.7|
|Fall |2002 |~PS491/711 |Causes of War |21 |3.9|
|Spring| 2003 |~PS491/711 |Causes of War |21 |3.8|
|Fall |2004 |~PS491/711 |Causes of War |19 |3.8|
|Fall |2001 |~PS674 |Theories of International Politics |11 |3.5|
|Spring |2004 |~PS674 |Theories of International Politics |12 |3.8|
|Fall |2000 |~PS711 |International Conflict |10 |3.8|
|Spring |2005 |~PS711 |International Conflict |8 |4.0|
Summary statistics:
Mean evaluation for undergraduate classes with more than 50 students enrolled: 3.4
Mean evaluation for undergraduate classes with fewer than 50 students enrolled: 3.7
Mean evaluation for all graduate level International Relations courses: 3.8
Mean grade given in the above listed undergraduate courses: 78.5%
Notes:
(1) The highest possible evaluation score at the University of Kentucky was 4.0; the Political Science departmental mean for all course evaluations averaged less than 3.3; the College of Arts and Sciences mean for all course evaluations was roughly 3.2.
(2) The classes marked “N/A” denote either web-based classes for which course evaluation statistics are not available or recent classes for which summary statistics are not yet available.
(3) Courses numbered 600 and above were graduate level at Kentucky. Courses marked with a “g” following the course number could be taken for graduate credit and often included 5-7 graduate students from both political science and other fields.
''Abstract:'' The empirical literature has found that interstate alliances are, with the exception of the nineteenth century after 1815, usually followed by war rather than by peace. This analysis tries to identify theoretically the characteristics of alliances that distinguish those that are followed by war from those that are followed by peace. It is argued that alliances that embody settlements of territorial disputes are most peaceful. Alliances consisting exclusively of major states or of states that have been successful in their last war are predicted to be war prone, while those that have the opposite characteristics are predicted to be followed by peace. An empirical analysis of the data shows that all of the above expectations are confirmed. The analysis concludes by using these characteristics to reexamine the classic Levy, 1981, study.
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler+vasquez&as_publication=&as_ylo=1998&as_yhi=1998&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler and John A. Vasquez. 1998. Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980. International Studies Quarterly. Volume 42: 4, pp. 785-807.
''Reprinted in:'' War (Sage Library of International Relations), edited by P. F. Diehl. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005.
''Co-author info:'' [[John Vasquez|http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/people/faculty/members/Vasquez.html]] was my dissertation advisor at Vanderbilt University. John is now at the University of Illinois.
''Abstract:'' The United States explicitly ties its foreign economic aid to respect for human rights by recipient countries. The United States is also the world’s largest aid donor. It is therefore surprising that no link has been established between US economic aid and greater respect for human rights abroad. I change this by arguing that US aid policies do affect human rights records but in an indirect way. Repressive leaders foregoing substantial amounts of US aid because of their human rights policies are also the leaders most likely to increase their respect for human rights in the future. I calculate the opportunity costs of human rights abuse, in part, by estimating a two-stage model with selection that simultaneously assesses the decision to grant aid and the amount of aid disbursed to each country. By modeling the process this way, I am able to demonstrate that human rights concerns affect only the decision to grant aid; need determines the amount of aid given after recipients are selected. I then use predicted aid amounts from the selection model to determine the likelihood and amount of aid for each country-year that was not selected to receive aid. These estimated opportunity costs correlate strongly with increases in human rights for “partly free” states.
[[Web Appendix|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/replication/WebAppendixHRJoP.pdf]]
[[Page Proofs|http://bama.ua.edu/~dmgibler/pubs/Gibler.JoP.2008.pdf]]
[[Google Scholar|http://scholar.google.com/scholar?as_q=&num=10&btnG=Search+Scholar&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_occt=any&as_sauthors=gibler&as_publication=journal+of+politics&as_ylo=2008&as_yhi=2008&as_allsubj=all&hl=en&lr=]].
''Replication Data.''
''Citation:'' Douglas M. Gibler. 2008. How United States Economic Aid Affects Policies of Repression. The Journal of Politics. Vol 70: 2 (April), pp. 513-526.
Here are descriptions of future classes with links to syllabi from previous semesters of the courses. Please feel free to email me if you have any questions.
!SPRING 2010
I'll be teaching a graduate course on issues in International Relations research during Spring 2010.
!SUMMER 2010
> ''INTERIM 2010''
>>I'll be teaching [[PSC321 Conflict and the Middle East|http://dl.getdropbox.com/u/48922/PSC321.Interim.2009.syllabus.pdf]]| during Interim 2010.
>''STUDY ABROAD IN BELGIUM''
>>During Summer II, I'll be leading a group of students on study abroad in Belgium. There are still some spaces available, but the deadline is quickly approaching, so sign up now! For details, see [[the website for the program|http://uabelgium.wordpress.com/]].
| !date | !user | !location | !storeUrl | !uploadDir | !toFilename | !backupdir | !origin |
| 06/07/2009 10:22:35 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 23/08/2009 11:28:28 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 23/08/2009 11:31:50 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 08/10/2009 10:12:44 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 04/01/2010 11:40:58 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 13/03/2010 08:32:52 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 20/04/2010 14:54:59 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 01/06/2010 22:06:35 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 01/06/2010 22:08:38 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 01/06/2010 22:16:06 | dmg | [[/|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://dmg.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
/***
|''Name:''|PasswordOptionPlugin|
|''Description:''|Extends TiddlyWiki options with non encrypted password option.|
|''Version:''|1.0.2|
|''Date:''|Apr 19, 2007|
|''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#PasswordOptionPlugin|
|''Author:''|BidiX (BidiX (at) bidix (dot) info)|
|''License:''|[[BSD open source license|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#%5B%5BBSD%20open%20source%20license%5D%5D ]]|
|''~CoreVersion:''|2.2.0 (Beta 5)|
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.PasswordOptionPlugin = {
major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 2,
date: new Date("Apr 19, 2007"),
source: 'http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#PasswordOptionPlugin',
author: 'BidiX (BidiX (at) bidix (dot) info',
license: '[[BSD open source license|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#%5B%5BBSD%20open%20source%20license%5D%5D]]',
coreVersion: '2.2.0 (Beta 5)'
};
config.macros.option.passwordCheckboxLabel = "Save this password on this computer";
config.macros.option.passwordInputType = "password"; // password | text
setStylesheet(".pasOptionInput {width: 11em;}\n","passwordInputTypeStyle");
merge(config.macros.option.types, {
'pas': {
elementType: "input",
valueField: "value",
eventName: "onkeyup",
className: "pasOptionInput",
typeValue: config.macros.option.passwordInputType,
create: function(place,type,opt,className,desc) {
// password field
config.macros.option.genericCreate(place,'pas',opt,className,desc);
// checkbox linked with this password "save this password on this computer"
config.macros.option.genericCreate(place,'chk','chk'+opt,className,desc);
// text savePasswordCheckboxLabel
place.appendChild(document.createTextNode(config.macros.option.passwordCheckboxLabel));
},
onChange: config.macros.option.genericOnChange
}
});
merge(config.optionHandlers['chk'], {
get: function(name) {
// is there an option linked with this chk ?
var opt = name.substr(3);
if (config.options[opt])
saveOptionCookie(opt);
return config.options[name] ? "true" : "false";
}
});
merge(config.optionHandlers, {
'pas': {
get: function(name) {
if (config.options["chk"+name]) {
return encodeCookie(config.options[name].toString());
} else {
return "";
}
},
set: function(name,value) {config.options[name] = decodeCookie(value);}
}
});
// need to reload options to load passwordOptions
loadOptionsCookie();
/*
if (!config.options['pasPassword'])
config.options['pasPassword'] = '';
merge(config.optionsDesc,{
pasPassword: "Test password"
});
*/
//}}}
/***
|''Name:''|UploadPlugin|
|''Description:''|Save to web a TiddlyWiki|
|''Version:''|4.1.0|
|''Date:''|May 5, 2007|
|''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#UploadPlugin|
|''Documentation:''|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#UploadPluginDoc|
|''Author:''|BidiX (BidiX (at) bidix (dot) info)|
|''License:''|[[BSD open source license|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#%5B%5BBSD%20open%20source%20license%5D%5D ]]|
|''~CoreVersion:''|2.2.0 (#3125)|
|''Requires:''|PasswordOptionPlugin|
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.UploadPlugin = {
major: 4, minor: 1, revision: 0,
date: new Date("May 5, 2007"),
source: 'http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#UploadPlugin',
author: 'BidiX (BidiX (at) bidix (dot) info',
coreVersion: '2.2.0 (#3125)'
};
//
// Environment
//
if (!window.bidix) window.bidix = {}; // bidix namespace
bidix.debugMode = false; // true to activate both in Plugin and UploadService
//
// Upload Macro
//
config.macros.upload = {
// default values
defaultBackupDir: '', //no backup
defaultStoreScript: "store.php",
defaultToFilename: "index.html",
defaultUploadDir: ".",
authenticateUser: true // UploadService Authenticate User
};
config.macros.upload.label = {
promptOption: "Save and Upload this TiddlyWiki with UploadOptions",
promptParamMacro: "Save and Upload this TiddlyWiki in %0",
saveLabel: "save to web",
saveToDisk: "save to disk",
uploadLabel: "upload"
};
config.macros.upload.messages = {
noStoreUrl: "No store URL in parmeters or options",
usernameOrPasswordMissing: "Username or password missing"
};
config.macros.upload.handler = function(place,macroName,params) {
if (readOnly)
return;
var label;
if (document.location.toString().substr(0,4) == "http")
label = this.label.saveLabel;
else
label = this.label.uploadLabel;
var prompt;
if (params[0]) {
prompt = this.label.promptParamMacro.toString().format([this.destFile(params[0],
(params[1] ? params[1]:bidix.basename(window.location.toString())), params[3])]);
} else {
prompt = this.label.promptOption;
}
createTiddlyButton(place, label, prompt, function() {config.macros.upload.action(params);}, null, null, this.accessKey);
};
config.macros.upload.action = function(params)
{
// for missing macro parameter set value from options
var storeUrl = params[0] ? params[0] : config.options.txtUploadStoreUrl;
var toFilename = params[1] ? params[1] : config.options.txtUploadFilename;
var backupDir = params[2] ? params[2] : config.options.txtUploadBackupDir;
var uploadDir = params[3] ? params[3] : config.options.txtUploadDir;
var username = params[4] ? params[4] : config.options.txtUploadUserName;
var password = config.options.pasUploadPassword; // for security reason no password as macro parameter
// for still missing parameter set default value
if ((!storeUrl) && (document.location.toString().substr(0,4) == "http"))
storeUrl = bidix.dirname(document.location.toString())+'/'+config.macros.upload.defaultStoreScript;
if (storeUrl.substr(0,4) != "http")
storeUrl = bidix.dirname(document.location.toString()) +'/'+ storeUrl;
if (!toFilename)
toFilename = bidix.basename(window.location.toString());
if (!toFilename)
toFilename = config.macros.upload.defaultToFilename;
if (!uploadDir)
uploadDir = config.macros.upload.defaultUploadDir;
if (!backupDir)
backupDir = config.macros.upload.defaultBackupDir;
// report error if still missing
if (!storeUrl) {
alert(config.macros.upload.messages.noStoreUrl);
clearMessage();
return false;
}
if (config.macros.upload.authenticateUser && (!username || !password)) {
alert(config.macros.upload.messages.usernameOrPasswordMissing);
clearMessage();
return false;
}
bidix.upload.uploadChanges(false,null,storeUrl, toFilename, uploadDir, backupDir, username, password);
return false;
};
config.macros.upload.destFile = function(storeUrl, toFilename, uploadDir)
{
if (!storeUrl)
return null;
var dest = bidix.dirname(storeUrl);
if (uploadDir && uploadDir != '.')
dest = dest + '/' + uploadDir;
dest = dest + '/' + toFilename;
return dest;
};
//
// uploadOptions Macro
//
config.macros.uploadOptions = {
handler: function(place,macroName,params) {
var wizard = new Wizard();
wizard.createWizard(place,this.wizardTitle);
wizard.addStep(this.step1Title,this.step1Html);
var markList = wizard.getElement("markList");
var listWrapper = document.createElement("div");
markList.parentNode.insertBefore(listWrapper,markList);
wizard.setValue("listWrapper",listWrapper);
this.refreshOptions(listWrapper,false);
var uploadCaption;
if (document.location.toString().substr(0,4) == "http")
uploadCaption = config.macros.upload.label.saveLabel;
else
uploadCaption = config.macros.upload.label.uploadLabel;
wizard.setButtons([
{caption: uploadCaption, tooltip: config.macros.upload.label.promptOption,
onClick: config.macros.upload.action},
{caption: this.cancelButton, tooltip: this.cancelButtonPrompt, onClick: this.onCancel}
]);
},
refreshOptions: function(listWrapper) {
var uploadOpts = [
"txtUploadUserName",
"pasUploadPassword",
"txtUploadStoreUrl",
"txtUploadDir",
"txtUploadFilename",
"txtUploadBackupDir",
"chkUploadLog",
"txtUploadLogMaxLine",
]
var opts = [];
for(i=0; i<uploadOpts.length; i++) {
var opt = {};
opts.push()
opt.option = "";
n = uploadOpts[i];
opt.name = n;
opt.lowlight = !config.optionsDesc[n];
opt.description = opt.lowlight ? this.unknownDescription : config.optionsDesc[n];
opts.push(opt);
}
var listview = ListView.create(listWrapper,opts,this.listViewTemplate);
for(n=0; n<opts.length; n++) {
var type = opts[n].name.substr(0,3);
var h = config.macros.option.types[type];
if (h && h.create) {
h.create(opts[n].colElements['option'],type,opts[n].name,opts[n].name,"no");
}
}
},
onCancel: function(e)
{
backstage.switchTab(null);
return false;
},
wizardTitle: "Upload with options",
step1Title: "These options are saved in cookies in your browser",
step1Html: "<input type='hidden' name='markList'></input><br>",
cancelButton: "Cancel",
cancelButtonPrompt: "Cancel prompt",
listViewTemplate: {
columns: [
{name: 'Description', field: 'description', title: "Description", type: 'WikiText'},
{name: 'Option', field: 'option', title: "Option", type: 'String'},
{name: 'Name', field: 'name', title: "Name", type: 'String'}
],
rowClasses: [
{className: 'lowlight', field: 'lowlight'}
]}
}
//
// upload functions
//
if (!bidix.upload) bidix.upload = {};
if (!bidix.upload.messages) bidix.upload.messages = {
//from saving
invalidFileError: "The original file '%0' does not appear to be a valid TiddlyWiki",
backupSaved: "Backup saved",
backupFailed: "Failed to upload backup file",
rssSaved: "RSS feed uploaded",
rssFailed: "Failed to upload RSS feed file",
emptySaved: "Empty template uploaded",
emptyFailed: "Failed to upload empty template file",
mainSaved: "Main TiddlyWiki file uploaded",
mainFailed: "Failed to upload main TiddlyWiki file. Your changes have not been saved",
//specific upload
loadOriginalHttpPostError: "Can't get original file",
aboutToSaveOnHttpPost: 'About to upload on %0 ...',
storePhpNotFound: "The store script '%0' was not found."
};
bidix.upload.uploadChanges = function(onlyIfDirty,tiddlers,storeUrl,toFilename,uploadDir,backupDir,username,password)
{
var callback = function(status,uploadParams,original,url,xhr) {
if (!status) {
displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.loadOriginalHttpPostError);
return;
}
if (bidix.debugMode)
alert(original.substr(0,500)+"\n...");
// Locate the storeArea div's
var posDiv = locateStoreArea(original);
if((posDiv[0] == -1) || (posDiv[1] == -1)) {
alert(config.messages.invalidFileError.format([localPath]));
return;
}
bidix.upload.uploadRss(uploadParams,original,posDiv);
};
if(onlyIfDirty && !store.isDirty())
return;
clearMessage();
// save on localdisk ?
if (document.location.toString().substr(0,4) == "file") {
var path = document.location.toString();
var localPath = getLocalPath(path);
saveChanges();
}
// get original
var uploadParams = Array(storeUrl,toFilename,uploadDir,backupDir,username,password);
var originalPath = document.location.toString();
// If url is a directory : add index.html
if (originalPath.charAt(originalPath.length-1) == "/")
originalPath = originalPath + "index.html";
var dest = config.macros.upload.destFile(storeUrl,toFilename,uploadDir);
var log = new bidix.UploadLog();
log.startUpload(storeUrl, dest, uploadDir, backupDir);
displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.aboutToSaveOnHttpPost.format([dest]));
if (bidix.debugMode)
alert("about to execute Http - GET on "+originalPath);
var r = doHttp("GET",originalPath,null,null,null,null,callback,uploadParams,null);
if (typeof r == "string")
displayMessage(r);
return r;
};
bidix.upload.uploadRss = function(uploadParams,original,posDiv)
{
var callback = function(status,params,responseText,url,xhr) {
if(status) {
var destfile = responseText.substring(responseText.indexOf("destfile:")+9,responseText.indexOf("\n", responseText.indexOf("destfile:")));
displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.rssSaved,bidix.dirname(url)+'/'+destfile);
bidix.upload.uploadMain(params[0],params[1],params[2]);
} else {
displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.rssFailed);
}
};
// do uploadRss
if(config.options.chkGenerateAnRssFeed) {
var rssPath = uploadParams[1].substr(0,uploadParams[1].lastIndexOf(".")) + ".xml";
var rssUploadParams = Array(uploadParams[0],rssPath,uploadParams[2],'',uploadParams[4],uploadParams[5]);
bidix.upload.httpUpload(rssUploadParams,convertUnicodeToUTF8(generateRss()),callback,Array(uploadParams,original,posDiv));
} else {
bidix.upload.uploadMain(uploadParams,original,posDiv);
}
};
bidix.upload.uploadMain = function(uploadParams,original,posDiv)
{
var callback = function(status,params,responseText,url,xhr) {
var log = new bidix.UploadLog();
if(status) {
// if backupDir specified
if ((params[3]) && (responseText.indexOf("backupfile:") > -1)) {
var backupfile = responseText.substring(responseText.indexOf("backupfile:")+11,responseText.indexOf("\n", responseText.indexOf("backupfile:")));
displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.backupSaved,bidix.dirname(url)+'/'+backupfile);
}
var destfile = responseText.substring(responseText.indexOf("destfile:")+9,responseText.indexOf("\n", responseText.indexOf("destfile:")));
displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.mainSaved,bidix.dirname(url)+'/'+destfile);
store.setDirty(false);
log.endUpload("ok");
} else {
alert(bidix.upload.messages.mainFailed);
displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.mainFailed);
log.endUpload("failed");
}
};
// do uploadMain
var revised = bidix.upload.updateOriginal(original,posDiv);
bidix.upload.httpUpload(uploadParams,revised,callback,uploadParams);
};
bidix.upload.httpUpload = function(uploadParams,data,callback,params)
{
var localCallback = function(status,params,responseText,url,xhr) {
url = (url.indexOf("nocache=") < 0 ? url : url.substring(0,url.indexOf("nocache=")-1));
if (xhr.status == httpStatus.NotFound)
alert(bidix.upload.messages.storePhpNotFound.format([url]));
if ((bidix.debugMode) || (responseText.indexOf("Debug mode") >= 0 )) {
alert(responseText);
if (responseText.indexOf("Debug mode") >= 0 )
responseText = responseText.substring(responseText.indexOf("\n\n")+2);
} else if (responseText.charAt(0) != '0')
alert(responseText);
if (responseText.charAt(0) != '0')
status = null;
callback(status,params,responseText,url,xhr);
};
// do httpUpload
var boundary = "---------------------------"+"AaB03x";
var uploadFormName = "UploadPlugin";
// compose headers data
var sheader = "";
sheader += "--" + boundary + "\r\nContent-disposition: form-data; name=\"";
sheader += uploadFormName +"\"\r\n\r\n";
sheader += "backupDir="+uploadParams[3] +
";user=" + uploadParams[4] +
";password=" + uploadParams[5] +
";uploaddir=" + uploadParams[2];
if (bidix.debugMode)
sheader += ";debug=1";
sheader += ";;\r\n";
sheader += "\r\n" + "--" + boundary + "\r\n";
sheader += "Content-disposition: form-data; name=\"userfile\"; filename=\""+uploadParams[1]+"\"\r\n";
sheader += "Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8" + "\r\n";
sheader += "Content-Length: " + data.length + "\r\n\r\n";
// compose trailer data
var strailer = new String();
strailer = "\r\n--" + boundary + "--\r\n";
data = sheader + data + strailer;
if (bidix.debugMode) alert("about to execute Http - POST on "+uploadParams[0]+"\n with \n"+data.substr(0,500)+ " ... ");
var r = doHttp("POST",uploadParams[0],data,"multipart/form-data; boundary="+boundary,uploadParams[4],uploadParams[5],localCallback,params,null);
if (typeof r == "string")
displayMessage(r);
return r;
};
// same as Saving's updateOriginal but without convertUnicodeToUTF8 calls
bidix.upload.updateOriginal = function(original, posDiv)
{
if (!posDiv)
posDiv = locateStoreArea(original);
if((posDiv[0] == -1) || (posDiv[1] == -1)) {
alert(config.messages.invalidFileError.format([localPath]));
return;
}
var revised = original.substr(0,posDiv[0] + startSaveArea.length) + "\n" +
store.allTiddlersAsHtml() + "\n" +
original.substr(posDiv[1]);
var newSiteTitle = getPageTitle().htmlEncode();
revised = revised.replaceChunk("<title"+">","</title"+">"," " + newSiteTitle + " ");
revised = updateMarkupBlock(revised,"PRE-HEAD","MarkupPreHead");
revised = updateMarkupBlock(revised,"POST-HEAD","MarkupPostHead");
revised = updateMarkupBlock(revised,"PRE-BODY","MarkupPreBody");
revised = updateMarkupBlock(revised,"POST-SCRIPT","MarkupPostBody");
return revised;
};
//
// UploadLog
//
// config.options.chkUploadLog :
// false : no logging
// true : logging
// config.options.txtUploadLogMaxLine :
// -1 : no limit
// 0 : no Log lines but UploadLog is still in place
// n : the last n lines are only kept
// NaN : no limit (-1)
bidix.UploadLog = function() {
if (!config.options.chkUploadLog)
return; // this.tiddler = null
this.tiddler = store.getTiddler("UploadLog");
if (!this.tiddler) {
this.tiddler = new Tiddler();
this.tiddler.title = "UploadLog";
this.tiddler.text = "| !date | !user | !location | !storeUrl | !uploadDir | !toFilename | !backupdir | !origin |";
this.tiddler.created = new Date();
this.tiddler.modifier = config.options.txtUserName;
this.tiddler.modified = new Date();
store.addTiddler(this.tiddler);
}
return this;
};
bidix.UploadLog.prototype.addText = function(text) {
if (!this.tiddler)
return;
// retrieve maxLine when we need it
var maxLine = parseInt(config.options.txtUploadLogMaxLine,10);
if (isNaN(maxLine))
maxLine = -1;
// add text
if (maxLine != 0)
this.tiddler.text = this.tiddler.text + text;
// Trunck to maxLine
if (maxLine >= 0) {
var textArray = this.tiddler.text.split('\n');
if (textArray.length > maxLine + 1)
textArray.splice(1,textArray.length-1-maxLine);
this.tiddler.text = textArray.join('\n');
}
// update tiddler fields
this.tiddler.modifier = config.options.txtUserName;
this.tiddler.modified = new Date();
store.addTiddler(this.tiddler);
// refresh and notifiy for immediate update
story.refreshTiddler(this.tiddler.title);
store.notify(this.tiddler.title, true);
};
bidix.UploadLog.prototype.startUpload = function(storeUrl, toFilename, uploadDir, backupDir) {
if (!this.tiddler)
return;
var now = new Date();
var text = "\n| ";
var filename = bidix.basename(document.location.toString());
if (!filename) filename = '/';
text += now.formatString("0DD/0MM/YYYY 0hh:0mm:0ss") +" | ";
text += config.options.txtUserName + " | ";
text += "[["+filename+"|"+location + "]] |";
text += " [[" + bidix.basename(storeUrl) + "|" + storeUrl + "]] | ";
text += uploadDir + " | ";
text += "[[" + bidix.basename(toFilename) + " | " +toFilename + "]] | ";
text += backupDir + " |";
this.addText(text);
};
bidix.UploadLog.prototype.endUpload = function(status) {
if (!this.tiddler)
return;
this.addText(" "+status+" |");
};
//
// Utilities
//
bidix.checkPlugin = function(plugin, major, minor, revision) {
var ext = version.extensions[plugin];
if (!
(ext &&
((ext.major > major) ||
((ext.major == major) && (ext.minor > minor)) ||
((ext.major == major) && (ext.minor == minor) && (ext.revision >= revision))))) {
// write error in PluginManager
if (pluginInfo)
pluginInfo.log.push("Requires " + plugin + " " + major + "." + minor + "." + revision);
eval(plugin); // generate an error : "Error: ReferenceError: xxxx is not defined"
}
};
bidix.dirname = function(filePath) {
if (!filePath)
return;
var lastpos;
if ((lastpos = filePath.lastIndexOf("/")) != -1) {
return filePath.substring(0, lastpos);
} else {
return filePath.substring(0, filePath.lastIndexOf("\\"));
}
};
bidix.basename = function(filePath) {
if (!filePath)
return;
var lastpos;
if ((lastpos = filePath.lastIndexOf("#")) != -1)
filePath = filePath.substring(0, lastpos);
if ((lastpos = filePath.lastIndexOf("/")) != -1) {
return filePath.substring(lastpos + 1);
} else
return filePath.substring(filePath.lastIndexOf("\\")+1);
};
bidix.initOption = function(name,value) {
if (!config.options[name])
config.options[name] = value;
};
//
// Initializations
//
// require PasswordOptionPlugin 1.0.1 or better
bidix.checkPlugin("PasswordOptionPlugin", 1, 0, 1);
// styleSheet
setStylesheet('.txtUploadStoreUrl, .txtUploadBackupDir, .txtUploadDir {width: 22em;}',"uploadPluginStyles");
//optionsDesc
merge(config.optionsDesc,{
txtUploadStoreUrl: "Url of the UploadService script (default: store.php)",
txtUploadFilename: "Filename of the uploaded file (default: in index.html)",
txtUploadDir: "Relative Directory where to store the file (default: . (downloadService directory))",
txtUploadBackupDir: "Relative Directory where to backup the file. If empty no backup. (default: ''(empty))",
txtUploadUserName: "Upload Username",
pasUploadPassword: "Upload Password",
chkUploadLog: "do Logging in UploadLog (default: true)",
txtUploadLogMaxLine: "Maximum of lines in UploadLog (default: 10)"
});
// Options Initializations
bidix.initOption('txtUploadStoreUrl','');
bidix.initOption('txtUploadFilename','');
bidix.initOption('txtUploadDir','');
bidix.initOption('txtUploadBackupDir','');
bidix.initOption('txtUploadUserName','');
bidix.initOption('pasUploadPassword','');
bidix.initOption('chkUploadLog',true);
bidix.initOption('txtUploadLogMaxLine','10');
/* don't want this for tiddlyspot sites
// Backstage
merge(config.tasks,{
uploadOptions: {text: "upload", tooltip: "Change UploadOptions and Upload", content: '<<uploadOptions>>'}
});
config.backstageTasks.push("uploadOptions");
*/
//}}}
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[[PUBLICATIONS]], with links to offprints and replication datasets.
[[WORKING PAPERS|Working Papers]].
[[GRANTS RECEIVED]].
[[RECENT CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION]].
[[DATASETS CREATED]].
[[PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE]].
[[EDUCATION]].
[[INVITED TALKS AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY]].
[[DEPARTMENTAL SERVICE]].
[[TEACHING AWARDS]].
The requirements for the International Studies Major and Minor are published in the catalog [[here|http://catalogs.ua.edu/catalog06/21500.html ]].
You will notice that there are four basic sets of requirements.
1.) You must take the full set of introductory courses.
2.) You must choose one of two tracks-either International Relations or International Business-and take at least four courses in that track.
3.) You must choose a geographical area of concentration and take at least three courses in that area.
4.) You must minor in a foreign language that is connected in some way to the area listed in #3 above. For example, if your area is South America, you can minor Spanish or Portuguese.
The Career Center at Alabama has a nice discussion of [[possible careers|http://www.career.ua.edu/documents/handouts/International%20Studies.pdf]] for a graduate with an International Studies Major.
[[Here|http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2007/12/a-simple-theory.html]] is an interesting argument about the purpose of a liberal education. Spoiler alert: you should focus on International Studies!
You may also choose to continue your education and go to [[graduate school|Advice on graduate schools]], [[law school|Advice on Law Schools]], or [[business school|Advice on Business Schools]].
Remember, though, as with any major in Arts and Sciences, you're really not limited in what you may choose to do after graduation.
Picking classes is fairly easy at Alabama.
First, you should make sure you fulfill the [[general core requirements|http://www.ua.edu/catalogs/undergraduate/18900.html]].
Next, you will have [[International Studies Major or Minor requirements|What are the requirements for an International Studies Major or Minor?]] that you have to fulfill.
Beyond that, it's your choice of electives. You may want to consult my advice for [[graduate schools|Advice on graduate schools]], [[law schools|Advice on Law Schools]], or [[business schools|Advice on Business Schools]], but generally, I like to advocate that students take a range of courses focused on methodology, broadly defined. For a discussion of this argument, see the following [[opinion piece|http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=515717]] by a Harvard economics professor.
At the end of your appointment, your advisor will sign the class form. You must take this to the main political science office, and then the form will be processed and your registration hold will be lifted. It usually takes 2-3 hours for your form to be processed, but plan ahead because it can soemtimes take a full 24 hours.
After your hold has been lifted, you are free to register for the classes you selected.
This is from the university catalog: "The international studies program includes a major and a minor. Their basic purpose, accomplished through a broad base of courses from various social sciences, is to provide a flexible curriculum aimed at promoting an understanding of world affairs and a thorough grasp of the problems facing various geographical areas of the world. In addition, the curriculum is designed to serve the following specific objectives: (1) the preparation of secondary school teachers in social studies; (2) the promotion of area specializations, including the study of one of the languages spoken in the area; and (3) preparation for postgraduate training in international affairs for those seeking professional careers in the foreign relations field. Students are encouraged to study abroad while fulfilling the requirements of the international studies program. Information on study-abroad opportunities is available from International Programs and Services in B. B. Comer Hall."
Typical students seem to be those who are interested in a broad range of international affairs, including those who may pursue careers that focus in some way on international relations or international business.
Your advisor will not choose your classes for you. Those are choices you have to make. So, you should come to the advising appointment with a good idea of the courses you wish to take the following semester. Thus, ''you should bring a class registration form that is already filled out'' to your advising appointment. These forms are available in the main Political Science office. [Be forewarned: I almost always send away advisees who have no clue what classes they wish to take.]
The advisor will meet with you to discuss whether your choice of classes is appropriate for you and also whether your class selections meet International Studies Major or Minor requirements and the core curriculum for the college and the university.
Again, let me emphasize, you should have your classes chosen before your advising appointment! See [[What classes should I take?]] for a helpful discussion.
When pre-registration starts, I will have a list of available appointment times posted just outside my door. My office is 314 ten Hoor Hall, which can be located on this [[campus map| http://tour.ua.edu/tourstops/tenhoor.html]]. Pre-registration dates are usually posted [[here|http://registrar.ua.edu/registration/]].
''Note:'' Do not email me for an appointment time since I'm often not in the office and do not have a copy of the available appointment times with me.
Here is a list of my current working papers. Each title is linked to an abstract that also describes the status of the research project.
!Territorial Threat
[[Political Entrepreneurs and the Sources of Territorial Dispute Initiation.]]
[[The Independent Judiciary and Democratic Backsliding]] (with Joseph Walsh)
[[Bordering on Peace]]: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict. (Book manuscript in progress)
[[Territorial Threats, Civil Wars, and Identity Formation.]] (with Marc Hutchison and Steve Miller).
[[Regional Democracy and Peaceful Borders: Assessing the Relationship between Conflict and Democracy in the Region]] (with Alex Braithwaite)
[[Dangerous Democratizers? New Democracies and the Likelihood of Conflict]] (with John Oneal).
[[Bordering on Democracy: External Threat and the Development of the Liberal State]].
!Alliances
[[Reconceptualizing alliances: how treaty nesting can fundamentally change the meaning of a concept]] (with Gary Goertz and Kathy Powers).
[[An Assessment of the Validity of Empirical Measures of State Satisfaction with the Status Quo]].
[[A General Theory of Alliances: Explaining Formation, Reliability, War, and War Expansion.]]
!Arms Races
[[Peaceful Arms Races?: The Non-traditional Arms Race of Insurgency and Terrorism]].
!Peace Treaties
[[Does Force or Agreement Lead to Peace?: A Collection and Analysis of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Settlement, 1816 to 2001]]
!Institutional Change
[[Opportunities Lost: Complex Institutional Change to Attract FDI.]] (with Trish Gibson)
[[When Will Leaders Respond?: The Tensions between US Economic and Military Aid.]]
<<search>><<closeAll>><<permaview>><<newTiddler>><<newJournal "DD MMM YYYY">><<saveChanges>><<tiddler TspotSidebar>><<slider chkSliderOptionsPanel OptionsPanel "options »" "Change TiddlyWiki advanced options">>
October 2007
I am optimistic regarding the amount of material a student will retain after a semester-long class, but I am also realistic. So, I approach teaching as a way of inculcating critical thinking about the political world that surrounds the student. In International Relations, my chosen subfield, critical thinking includes, among other things, being able to evaluate why political leaders do what they do. I have found that understanding the pressures placed on leaders, understanding the role of information and uncertainty in leader decisions, and realizing how leaders overcome these problems constitute some of the best ways of approaching critical thinking in the International Relations classroom.
In all my classes, undergraduate or graduate, I begin with a discussion of the scientific method. I realize that the scientific approach may be a conceit that is not amenable to investigations of all types of knowledge, but I have found that this approach allows me to begin each course with every student on similar footing. With the acceptance of this unified approach, we as a class are then able to critically assess arguments and evidence on the subject matter of the course. For example, in my Introduction to International Relations, Causes of War, and American Foreign Policy classes, I often begin the semester with a discussion about what causes conflict between countries. Invariably, the discussion turns to religion as a prime cause of interstate conflict, and so I then use the students’ beginning thoughts on religion and conflict as a basis for having them construct testable statements about the world (hypotheses). The students find that this process is much more difficult than they first thought it would be. More importantly, they begin to think about causal relationships between the variables they observe - what does it mean for religion to cause conflict? What agents are responsible for leading states into conflict with each other over religion? How do we know the association between religion and conflict is not spurious to another variable? Ultimately, through this process, they begin to realize how tenuous their initial reactions actually were.
With hypotheses established, I lead the discussion toward questions about how to gather empirical evidence to test the hypotheses. Human behavior is often strategic (i.e., dependent upon the actions of others), and this affects the evidence we use to test our hypotheses. Leaders often have to guess about the intentions and capabilities of other actors, both foreign and domestic - will the other leader attack or are they bluffing? Do they have the capabilities to attack? Will my supporters be happy with this policy or will they remove me from office? By understanding the role of this type of uncertainty and strategy in International Relations, students are forced to consider that what they observe is not necessarily consistent with the preferences of the actors involved. Thus, students also learn how to think critically about observed behavior, about the role of their environment, and about how various institutions shape their observations of the world.
I use these types of early discussions as the basis for most of my upper level courses. In these courses, I consistently refer to the first discussion as a way of analyzing the empirical evidence I bring to the course throughout the semester. Each class meeting is usually an argument from the empirical literature, so the students learn to evaluate each argument based on common principles - how well formed is the theory? Do the tests match the theory? Is the approach to gathering evidence consistent with the hypothesis? Is there anything in the data generation process that would lead one to discount the results? Thus, by the end of the course, students are able to critically evaluate almost any type of argument, regardless of whether they are actually employing the scientific method. I believe this is why my former students have often come back to remark how beneficial my approach was to their studies in law school, in business school, and in their careers after college.
My introductory undergraduate courses and my graduate-level courses differ from this approach only slightly. In the introductory undergraduate courses my goals are focused on several key concepts in International Relations that establish the foundations for later courses. I still start with the discussion of science, but I concentrate future discussions on more basic assessments of how we gain knowledge about the world. This allows me to discuss ways of approaching political science, about various methodologies in the field, and most importantly, familiarizes the student with ways of thinking about politics. My graduate-level courses are more intense versions of the upper-level undergraduate courses. A survey of readings from the empirical literature and critical discussions of subfields dominate these discussions.
Overall, I hope (and most often do conclude) that students will retain quite a bit of factual information after one of my courses. Regardless, though, I am certain that almost every student will be able to critically evaluate their own thinking and the arguments presented by those around them after having completed one of my courses.