PSC 615    American National Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Institutions

University of Alabama

Spring 2008

Instructor: Steve Borrelli

307 ten Hoor, University of Alabama

(205) 348 3802, 348 5980 (main office),

Mailing Address: Box 870213 University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa AL 35487 0213

Mailbox: Room 346A ten Hoor, open 7 AM - 4:30 PM weekdays

E Mail Address for Questions, Comments, Notification of Absences, etc. sborrell@bama.ua.edu

(If sending me papers online, please use the E-Learning function for this course)

My website: bama.ua.edu/~sborrell

OFFICE HOURS: Wednesday 1:30 – 3 PM; Thursday 3:30 – 5 PM; and by appointment


COURSE DESCRIPTION:

An overview of classic and contemporary original empirical research on the US Congress, the US Presidency, and the US Supreme Court. Emphasis will be on learning not just the substantive findings of this research, but who produced it, the theoretical frameworks underlying it, the process by which it is is produced, and (hopefully) how it all fits together.


COURSE OBJECTIVES:

Students will

a.) Gain a basic familiarity with and understanding of the major current issues, authors, and findings in the study of Congress, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court, with some attention to the politics of the executive branch;

b.) Learn how to evaluate critically research done by other authors, pointing out strengths and weaknesses in logic, definition of concepts and variables, research design and methodology, and/or interpretation of evidence;

c.) Learn how to answer questions similar to those that will appear on comprehensive exams in the area of American politics, which will involve associating researchers with their work, and linking research done by different authors at different points in time.



BOOKS TO PURCHASE.


  1. Issue Politics in Congress by Tracy Sulkin Publisher: Cambridge University Press (2005).


2. Presidential Power (Power, Conflict, and Democracy: American Politics into the 21st Century)

by Robert Y. Shapiro (Editor), Martha Joynt Kumar (Editor), Lawrence R. Jacobs (Editor)
Publisher: Columbia University Press (2000).


3. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited

by Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth.

Publisher: Cambridge University Press (2002).




ARTICLES TO DOWNLOAD

The bulk of the reading for this course will be articles from peer-reviewed academic journals. All of these journals are available in electronic form through the University Library website (www.lib.ua.edu, click “Electronic Journals” and search by the journal title).

Note that the Shapiro et al books is an anthology, containing relatively self-contained research articles by different authors. In class, on papers, and in the exams, you will refer to and cite each chapter by its own author(s), rather than by the book’s editor(s). Also, in some readings, other authors whom you will not read directly will be cited and summarized extensively (e.g., Ferejohn and Fiorina cite Mayhew, Edwards summarizes Neustadt, Lieberman summarizes both Neustadt and Skorownek). When attributing ideas to authors, try to attribute them to their originators even if you have not read the original works firsthand.


COURSE REQUIREMENTS


A.) WEEKLY QUIZZES (collectively, worth 20% of course grade)

Each class session will begin with a short-answer (i.e., answers will be one sentence or less) quiz designed to ascertain whether basic and fundamental points in the readings were read and understood. Each quiz will involve some choice on the student’s part, so he or she will not necessarily be expected to answer a question on every reading every week. Quizzes will not cover statistical or mathematical details (in part because the instructor’s own math/statistical competency has its limits) or minutiae; questions should be readily answerable by anyone who made an honest effort to read the articles or book. The lowest two quiz grades will be dropped (so if anyone misses more than two quizzes, one or more zeroes will be counted in his or her quiz average). Because of the two dropped quizzes, makeups will not be offered. .

B.) CLASS PARTICIPATION (worth 15% of course grade).

Each week, each student will be evaluated on a 0-10 score based on the quality and quantity of his or her participation in class. Participation can include student-initiated questions and specific requests for clarification and explanation as well as comments, answers to instructor or other students’ questions, criticisms, insights, etc. The instructor will have reasonable expectations for participation given the size of the class and the nature of the material. The two lowest weekly participation scores will be dropped, so if students miss more than two class sessions, zeroes will be counted into the final participation score.

  1. “ AMERICAN POLITICS JOURNAL ARTICLE IDOL” (collectively, worth 15% of course grade). Just as Clive Davis and other music moguls are constantly searching for new musical talent, Dr. Borrelli is constantly searching for new articles to add to the PSC 615 syllabus. Each week, five students will be tasked with finding and presenting five different journal articles to offer for possible inclusion in future PSC 615 syllabi. (The five must coordinate their efforts so that no two students are presenting the same article). Each of the five articles must cite at least one of the articles/chapters in the syllabus for that week (“citation progeny” can be found easily using Google Scholar). Each student will give a 10-minute oral summary and a single-page written summary of the article distributed to all students, and will argue for why his or her article should be included in the next PSC 615 syllabus (obvious arguments would include the importance of the subject matter and its relevance to other readings already in the syllabus). The remaining students will serve as judges, a la Randy, Paula, and Simon, and will give feedback and ultimately vote on the suitability of each presented article for future syllabus inclusion. (These judges are welcome to offer specific reasons for their decisions, which will count toward their respective class participation grades). The presenters will be graded on the quality of their oral and written summaries and arguments.


  1. MIDTERM EXAM (worth 20% of course grade) February 25th in class


  1. FINAL EXAM (worth 30% of final grade) to be held on Friday, May 9, at 11:30 AM.




SCHEDULE OF TOPICS AND READINGS


Introduction and Orientation -- January 14


NO CLASS JANUARY 21st due to MLK, Jr. Holiday



  1. Congressional Elections – The Incumbency Advantage (January 28)


Cover, Albert. 1977. One Good Term Deserves Another. American Journal of Political Science, 21 (August) 523- .


Ferejohn, John. 1977. On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections. American Political Science Review, 71 (March) 165-176.


Fiorina, Morris. 1988. The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It. American Political Science Review, 71 (March) 177-181


Johannes, John, and John MacAdams. 1981. The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is it Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? American Journal of Political Science, 25 (August) 512-542.


Fiorina, Morris. 1981. Some Problems in Studying the Effect of Resource Allocation in Congressional Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 25 (August) 543-567.


Cox, Gary, and Jonathan Katz. 1996. Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections Grow? American Journal of Political Science, 40 (May) 478-497.



  1. Congressional Elections—National v. Local Factors, Accountability (February 4)


Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1989. Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy. American Political Science Review, 83 (June) 373-398.


Jacobson, Gary. 1989. Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of US House Elections. American Political Science Review, 83 (September) 773-793.


Marra, Robin, and Charles Ostrom. 1989. Explaining Seat Change in the US House of Representatives, 1950-1986. American Journal of Political Science, 33 (August) 541-569.


Born, Richard. 1990. The Shared Fortunes of Congress and Congressmen: Members May Run from Congress, but They Can’t Hide. Journal of Politics 52 (November) 1223.


Norpoth, Helmut. 2001. Divided Government and Economic Voting. Journal of Politics, 63 (May) 414-426.


Jones, David, and Monika McDermott. 2004. The Responsible Party Government Model in House and Senate Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 48 (January) 1-12






  1. Congressional Procedures, Partisanship, and Leadership (February 11)


Cooper, Joseph, and David Brady. 1981. Institutional Conflict and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn. American Political Science Review, 75 (June) 411-425.

Binder, Sara.  1996.  The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice:  Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789 1990.  American Political Science Review, 90: 8  20.

Binder, Sara, and Steven Smith.  1998.  Political Goals and Procedural Choice in the Senate.  Journal of Politics, 60: 398 416.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Where’s the Party? British Journal of Political Science, 23:235-66.


***Smith, Steven. 2007. Recent Theories of Party Influence: Cartel and Conditional Party Government Theory. Chapter 5 of Steven Smith, Party Influence in Congress.

Available on my website


*** Sinclair, Barbara. 2002. Do Parties Matter? In David Brady and Mathew McCubbins, eds, Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress. Stanford University Press.

Article available on my website



  1. Congressional Committees; Interest Group Influence in Congress (February 18)


Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers? American Political Science Review, 84 (March):149-163.


Hall, Richard, and Bernard Grofman. 1990. The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias. American Political Science Review, 84: 1149-1166.


Krehbiel, Keith, Kenneth Shepsle, and Barry Weingast. 1987. Why are Congressional Committees Powerful? American Political Science Review, 81:929-948.


Baumgartner, Frank, Bryan Jones, and Michael MacLeod. 2000. The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions. Journal of Politics, 62: 321-349.


Hall, Richard, and Frank Wayman. 1990. Buying Time: Moneyed Interest and the Nature of Bias. American Political Science Review, 84: 797-820.


Hojnacki, Marie, and David Kimball. 1998. Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress. American Political Science Review, 92" 775-790.



  1. Congress and Representation; Public Opinion Toward Congress (Virtual Class Day; TBD)


Miller, Warren, and Donald Stokes. 1963. Constituency Influence in Congress. American Political Science Review, 57 (March) 45-56.


Fenno, Richard. 1977. US House Members in their Constituencies: An Exploration. American Political Science Review, 71 (September) 883-917.


Oppenheimer, Bruce. 1996. The Representational Experience: The Effect of State Population on Senator-Constituency Linkages. American Journal of Political Science, 40 (November) 1280-1299.


Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Holloran. 1996. Do Majority Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress? American Political Science Review, 90 (December) 794-812.


Lublin, David. 1999. Racial Redistricting and African American Representation. American Political Science Review, 93 (March): 183-191. (with Response from Cameron et al).


Durr, Robert, John Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. Explaining Congressional Approval. American Journal of Political Science, 41 (January): 175-207.


February 25

Relating Congressional Elections to Congressional Policymaking (first hour of class)

Read Sulkin book (entire)

MIDTERM EXAM ON CONGRESS (2nd Half of Class)



  1. Studying the Presidency: Theoretical Approaches (March 3)


From Shapiro et al. book:

Edwards, "Neustadt's Power Approach"

Gunnell, "Richard Neustadt in the History of American Political Science"

Preston, "The President's Inner Circle" (Psychological Approach)

Lieberman, "Political Time and Policy Coalitions" (Historical/Contextual Approach vs. Individual Power Approach)

Neustadt, "A Preachment from Retirement"

Jacobs and Shapiro, "Presidential Power, Institutions, and Democracy" (New Institutional Approach)


Terry Moe and William Howell. 1999. “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29 (December) 850.



  1. Presidential Approval and Presidential Selection (March 10)


Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1991. The Structure of Presidential Approval. Journal of Politics, 53: 993 1017.


Gronke, Paul, and Brian Newman. 2003. “FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?: A Field Essay on Presidential Approval.” Political Research Quarterly, 56 (December): 501-515.


Nicholson, Stephen, Gary Segura, and Nathan Woods. 2002. Presidential Approval and the Mixed Blessing of Divided Government. Journal of Politics, 64 (August) 701-720.


Norrander, Barbara. 1996. Field Essay: Presidential Nomination Politics in the Post-Reform Era. Political Research Quarterly, 49 (December) 875-915.


Norrander, Barbara. 2006. The Attrition Game: Initial Resources, Initial Contests and the Exit of Candidates During the US Presidential Primary Season. British Journal of Political Science , 36: 487-507.


Wlezien, Christopher, and Robert Erikson. 2002. The Timeline of Presidential Election Campaigns. Journal of Politics 64 (November) 969-993.




NO CLASS MARCH 17 (SPRING BREAK)





  1. Political Control of the Bureaucracy (March 24)


Wood, B. Dan, and Richard Waterman. 1991. The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy. American Political Science Review, 85 (September) 801-828.


Carpenter, Daniel. 1996. Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation. American Political Science Review 90 (June): 283-302.


Rinquist, Evan. 1995. Political Control and Policy Impact in the EPA's Office of Water Quality. American Journal of Political Science, 39:336-363.


Howell, William, and David Lewis. 2002. Agencies by Presidential Design. Journal of Politics, 64 (November): 1095-1114.


Mete, Mihriye. 2002. Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments: Politicians, Taxpayers, and the IRS. Journal of Politics, 64: 384-407


Whitford, Andrew. 2005. The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principals. Journal of Politics 67 (February) 29-49.



  1. Executive-Legislative Relations, and the Politics of Gridlock (March 31)


Kiewiet, Rod, and Matt McCubbins. 1988. Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions. American Journal of Political Science, 32: 713-736.


Covington, Cary, J. Mark Wrighton, and Rhonda Kinney. 1995. A “Presidency-Augmented” Model of Presidential Success on House Roll Call Votes.” American Journal of Political Science, 39 (November): 1001-1024.


Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Scott de Marchi. 2002. Presidential Approval and Legislative Success. Journal of

Politics, 64: 491-509.


From Shapiro et al. book:


Cameron, "Bargaining and Presidential Power."


Epstein and O'Halloran, "The Institutional Face of Presidential Power"


Binder, Sarah. 1999. The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96. American Political Science Review, 93 (September) 519-533.



  1. Do Presidents Influence Public Opinion? (or Vice Versa)? -- (April 7)


Samuel Kernell, Excerpt from “Going Public” *** (CQ Press, 1997)


George Edwards, Excerpt from “On Deaf Ears” *** (Yale Univ. Press, 2003)


Baum, Matthew, and Samuel Kernell. “Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential Television?” American Political Science Review 55 (March 1999): 99-114


Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. The President’s Legislative Influence from Public Appeals. American Journal of Political Science, 45 (April): 313-329.


Cohen, Jeffrey. 1995. Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda. American Journal of Political Science, 39: 87-107.


Edwards, George, and B. Dan Wood. 1999. Who Influences Whom? President, Congress, and the Media. American Political Science Review, 93: 327-344.


Young, Garry, and William Perkins. 2005. Presidential Rhetoric, the Public Agenda, and the End of Presidential Television’s “Golden Age.” Journal of Politics, 67: 1190-1205.



  1. The Supreme Court: Nominations and Confirimations (April 14)


Segal, Jeffrey, Charles Cameron, and Albert Cover. 1992. A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 1. (Feb., 1992), pp. 96-121


Moraski, Bryon, and Charles Shipan. 1999. The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices. American Journal of Political Science, 43 (October): 1069-1095, .


Ogundele, Ayo, and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. Re-Examining the Impact of the Bork Nomination to the Supreme Court. Political Research Quarterly, 52: 403-420.


Johnson, Timothy, and Jason Roberts. 2004. Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process. Journal of Politics, 66 (August), p. 663.


Epstein, Lee, Rene Lindstatdt, Jeffrey Segal, and Chad Westerland. 2006. The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees. Journal of Politics, 68 (May): 296.



  1. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (April 21)

Spaeth and Segal book, entire.


  1. Implications of the Attitudinal Model for Sua Sponte and Stare Decisis (April 28)


McGuire, Kevin, and Barbara Palmer. 1995. Issue Fluidity on the Supreme Court. American Political Science Review, 89 (September): 691-702


Epstein, Lee, Jeffrey Segal, and Timothy Johnson. 1996. The Claim of Issue Creation on the US Supreme Court. American Political Science Review, 90 (December) 845-852.


McGurie, Kevin, and Barbara Palmer. 1996. Issues, Agendas, and Decision Making on the Supreme Court. American Political Science Review, 90 (December), 853-865.


Segal, Jeffrey and Harold Spaeth. 1996. The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices. American Journal of Political Science 40:971


Brisbin, Richard. 1996. Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth, and the Function of Law in Supreme Court Decisionmaking. American Journal of Political Science 40:1004


Knight, Jack and Lee Epstein. 1996. The Norm of Stare Decisis. AJPS 40:1018.


Brenner, Saul and Marc Stier. 1996. Retesting Segal and Spaeth’s Stare Decisis Model. AJPS 40:1036.