PSC
615 ‑‑ American National Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
Institutions
Spring
2010
Instructor: Steve Borrelli
307
ten Hoor
Mailbox:
Room 346A ten Hoor, open
E‑Mail
Address for Questions, Comments, Notification of Absences, etc. sborrell@bama.ua.edu
(If sending me papers online, please use the E-Learning function for this course)
My
website: bama.ua.edu/~sborrell
OFFICE
HOURS: Wednesdays and Fridays,
COURSE
DESCRIPTION:
An overview of classic and contemporary
original empirical research on the US Congress, the US Presidency, and the US
Supreme Court. Emphasis will be on learning not just the
substantive findings of this research, but who produced it, the theoretical
frameworks underlying it, the process by which it is is
produced, and (hopefully) how it all fits together.
COURSE
OBJECTIVES:
Students
will
a.) Gain a basic familiarity with and
understanding of the major current issues, authors, and findings in the study
of Congress, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court, with some attention to the
politics of the executive branch;
b.) Learn how to evaluate critically research
done by other authors, pointing out strengths and weaknesses in logic,
definition of concepts and variables, research design and methodology, and/or
interpretation of evidence;
c.) Learn how to answer questions similar to
those that will appear on comprehensive exams in the area of American politics,
which will involve associating researchers with their work, linking research
done by different authors at different points in time, and identifying both
points of consensus and points of disagreement in the academic literature.
BOOKS
TO PURCHASE.
Steven
Smith. 2007. Party Influence in Congress.
George
Edwards III. 2009. The Strategic President: Persuasion and
James
Gibson and Gregory Caldeira.
2009. Citizens, Courts, and
Confirmations.
Thomas
Hammond, Chris Bonneau, and Reginald Sheehan.
2005. Strategic Behavior and
Policy Choice on the
ARTICLES
TO DOWNLOAD
The
bulk of the reading for this course will be articles from peer-reviewed
academic journals. All of these
journals are available in electronic form through the University Library
website (www.lib.ua.edu, click “Electronic
Journals” and search by the journal title).
GENERAL
POINT ABOUT
If
you aren’t accustomed to this already, you should get used to referring to the
readings by the authors’ last names (in case of multiple articles by the same
author(s), you should remember both authors and dates). Sometimes we will be reading one author’s
summaries of others’ work, rather than the original works themselves (for
example, we will be reading Smith’s summary of Aldrich and Rohde’s work on
parties rather than any original works by Aldrich and Rohde.) In such cases, assuming that the later author
has accurately characterized the older work (which the peer review process
tries to assure) you
may and should attribute ideas and findings to their original authors even if
we have not read them.
COMMONLY
USED JOURNAL ACRONYMS: APSR (American
Political Science Review), JOP (Journal of Politics), AJPS (American Journal of Political
Science), Pres.SQ (Presidential Studies Quarterly)
COURSE
REQUIREMENTS
A.) WEEKLY QUIZZES (collectively, worth 25% of course
grade)
Each
class session will begin with a short-answer (i.e., answers will be one
sentence or less) quiz designed to ascertain whether basic and fundamental
points in the readings were read and understood. Each quiz will involve some choice on the
student’s part, so he or she will not necessarily be expected to answer a
question on every reading every week.
Quizzes will not cover statistical or mathematical details (in part
because the instructor’s own math/statistical competency has its limits) or
minutiae; questions
should be readily answerable by anyone who made an honest effort to read the
articles or book. The lowest two quiz
grades will be dropped (so if anyone misses more than two quizzes, one or more
zeroes will be counted in his or her quiz average). Because of the two dropped quizzes, makeups will not be offered. .
B.) CLASS PARTICIPATION (worth 15% of course grade).
Each
week, each student will be evaluated on a 0-10 score based on the quality and
quantity of his or her participation in class.
Participation can include student-initiated questions and specific
requests for clarification and explanation as well as comments, answers to
instructor or other students’ questions, criticisms, insights, etc. The instructor will have reasonable
expectations for participation given the size of the class and the nature of
the material. The two lowest weekly
participation scores will be dropped, so if students miss more than two class
sessions, zeroes will be counted into the final participation score.
C.)
“ AMERICAN (POLITICS
JOURNAL ARTICLE) IDOL” (collectively, worth 20% of course grade). Just
as Clive Davis and other music moguls are constantly searching for new musical talent,
Dr. Borrelli is constantly searching for new articles to add to the PSC 615
syllabus. Each week, five students will
be tasked with finding and presenting a relatively new journal article to offer
for possible inclusion in future PSC 615 syllabi. (The five must coordinate their efforts so
that no two students are presenting the same article). Each of the five articles must have been
published since 2004, and each cite at least one of the articles/chapters in
the syllabus for that week (“citation progeny” can be found easily using Google
Scholar). Each student will give a 5-minute
oral summary and a single-page written
summary of the article distributed to all students, and will argue for why his
or her article should be included in the next PSC 615 syllabus (obvious
arguments would include the importance of the subject matter and its relevance
to other readings already in the syllabus).
The remaining students will serve as judges, and will give feedback and
ultimately vote on the suitability of each presented article for future
syllabus inclusion. Votes and comments
will be submitted via E-Learning discussion posts during the week after the
articles are presented. The presenters will be graded on the quality
of their oral and written summaries and arguments.
D.) FINAL
EXAM (worth 40% of final grade, closed-book but with possible questions
distributed in advance, in-classroom) to be held on XXXXXXX
COURSE
POLICIES
1.) Late paper policy: Late papers will be assessed a
grade penalty commensurate with the degree of lateness. Papers that are late because of verified
illness or family emergency will not be penalized IF I am informed before or on
the due date of the illness or emergency; if I am not informed, the usual
penalties will apply. Participation in
University activities (including athletics) is NOT an acceptable excuse for a
late paper; students
missing class for this reason are expected to find ways to turn their papers in
early or ontime.
2.) Disability Policy: If you
have a disability that requires special accommodations in this class you need
to contact the Office of Disability Services, 133B Martha Parham East, 348-4285
(or ods@bama.edu). The Office of Disability Services will work
with you and me to come up with specific plan that will meet your needs.
3.) Attendance Policy: Although attendance
is not technically mandatory, a missed class will automatically result in a “0”
for participation and a “0” for the quiz administered that day. Since the two lowest participation scores and
quiz scores will be dropped, missing more than two class sessions will have
serious negative consequences for one’s grade.
5.) Makeups
Policy: Makeups for the final exam will be allowed only in cases of independently
documented illness or family emergency covering the exact date of the missed
exam. It is entirely the student’s
responsibility to notify the instructor in a timely fashion of the reasons for
his her absence, to produce adequate verification of those reasons, and to
schedule a makeup exam. Makeups for quizzes will not be given.
6.) Academic Misconduct Policy: The
SCHEDULE
OF TOPICS AND
Introduction
and Orientation -- January 11
NO CLASS January
18th due to MLK, Jr.
PART ONE: CONGRESS
I.
Congressional Elections – The
Incumbency Advantage (January 25)
Mayhew, David. 1974. Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals. Polity, 6: 295-317.
Ferejohn, John. 1977. On the Decline of Competition in Congressional
Elections. APSR ,71
(March) 165-176.
Fiorina, Morris. 1977. The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It. APSR, 71 (March) 177-181
Johannes, John, and John MacAdams. 1981.
The Congressional Incumbency Effect:
Is it Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? AJPS, 25 (August) 512-542.
Fiorina, Morris. 1981. Some Problems in Studying the Effect of
Resource Allocation in Congressional Elections.
AJPS, 25 (August) 543-567.
Cox, Gary, and Jonathan Katz. 1996. Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in US House
Elections Grow? AJPS, 40 (May) 478-497.
*Cox, Gary, and Jonathan Katz.
2002. “Reassessing the
Incumbency Advantage.” From Cox and
Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander, Cambridge University Press, pp.
194-208. On my
website.
Carson, Jamie, Erik Engstrom, and Jason Roberts. 2007. Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the
Incumbency Advantage in Congress. APSR
(May) 289-302.
II.
Congressional Elections—National
v. Local Factors, Accountability (February 1)
Jacobson, Gary. 1989. Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of US
House Elections. APSR, 83 (September)
773-793.
Born, Richard. 1990. The Shared Fortunes of Congress and Congressmen: Members May Run from Congress, but They Can’t
Hide. JOP 52
(November) 1223.
Erikson, Robert.
1990. Economic Conditions and the
Congressional Vote: A Review of the
Macro-level Evidence. AJPS 34 (May)
373-399.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David Brady, and John Cogan.
2002. Out of Step, Out of
Office: Electoral Accountability and
House Members’ Voting. APSR 127-140.
Jones, David,
and Monika McDermott. 2004.
The Responsible Party Government Model in House and Senate
Elections. AJPS, 48 (January) 1-12
Burden, Barry,
and Amber Wichowsky. N.D. Local and National Forces in Congressional Elections. Unpublished MS,
III. The Influence of Congressional Parties and
Party Leaders: Leviathans or
Lilliputians? (February 8)
Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Where’s the Party? British Journal of Political Science,
23:235-66.
Smith book, Chapters 1, 2,
3, 5, 7, 8
IV. Congressional Committees/Interest Groups (Feburary 15)
Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. Are Congressional Committees Composed of
Preference Outliers? APSR, 84 (March):149-163.
Hall, Richard, and Bernard Grofman. 1990.
The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee
Bias. APSR, 84: 1149-1166.
Maltzman, Forrest. 1995. Meeting Competing Demands: Committee Performance in the Post-Reform
House. AJPS, 39 (August) 653-682.
Hall, Richard, and Frank Wayman. 1990.
Buying Time: Moneyed Interest and
the Nature of Bias. APSR, 84: 797-820.
Hojnacki, Marie, and David Kimball. 1998.
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress. APSR, 92" 775-790.
Esterling, Kevin. 2007. Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to
Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees.
APSR 101: 93-109.
V.
Public Attitudes Toward
Congress & Congressional Responsiveness to the Public (February 22)
Miller, Warren, and Donald
Stokes. 1963. Constituency Influence in Congress. APSR, 57 (March) 45-56.
Fenno, Richard. 1977. US House Members in their
Constituencies: An Exploration. APSR, 71 (September) 883-917.
Oppenheimer, Bruce.
1996. The Representational
Experience: The Effect of State
Population on Senator-Constituency Linkages.
AJPS, 40 (November) 1280-1299.
Durr, Robert, John Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. Explaining Congressional Approval. AJPS, 41 (January): 175-207.
*
Ramirez, Mark. 2009. The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on
Congressional Approval. AJPS, 53 (July)
681-694.
PART TWO: THE PRESIDENCY
I.
Studying the
Presidency: Six Approaches (March 1st)
Neustadt, Richard. 1960. Excerpt from Presidential Power.
Kernell, Samuel. Excerpt from
Going Public (1997, Congressional Quarterly Press), p. 1 – 55.
Caesar, James, Glen Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph
Bessette. 1981.
The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency.
PresSQ,.11 (Spring) 158-171.
Hoekstra, Douglas.
1999. The Politics of
Politics: Skowronek
and Presidential Research. PresSQ, 29: 657-671.
Herrmann, Margaret, and Thomas
Preston. 1994. Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign
Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style
on Executive Arrangements. Political
Psychology, 15 (1) 75-96.
Terry Moe and William Howell. 1999. “Unilateral Action and Presidential
Power: A Theory.” Pres SQ, 29 (December) 850.
II.
Presidential Approval
(March 8th)
Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley.
1991. The Structure of
Presidential Approval. JOP, 53: 993‑1017.
Edwards, George, William
Mitchell, and Reed Welch. 1995. Explaining Presidential
Approval: The Significance of Issue
Salience. AJPS 39: 108-134.
Gronke, Paul, and Brian Newman. 2003.
“FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?: A Field Essay on Presidential Approval.” Political Research Quarterly, 56 (December):
501-515.
Mcavoy, Gregory. 2008.
Substance v. Style:
Distinguishing Presidential Job Performance from Favorability. PresSQ, 38: 284-299.
Groelig, Tim, and Matthew Baum. 2008.
Crossing the Water’s Edge: Elite
Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and the Rally Round the Flag Phenomenon. JOP, 70:1065-1085.
III.
Political Control of the
Bureaucracy (March 22nd)
Wood, B. Dan, and Richard
Waterman. 1991. The Dynamics of Political Control of the
Bureaucracy. APSR, 85 (September) 801-828.
Rinquist, Evan. 1995. Political Control and Policy Impact in the
EPA's Office of Water Quality. AJPS,
39:336-363.
Mete, Mihriye. 2002.
Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments: Politicians, Taxpayers,
and the IRS. JOP, 64: 384-407
Whitford, Andrew. 2005. The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple
Principals. JOP 67 (February)
29-49.
Gilmour, John and David Lewis. 2006. Political Appointees and the Competence of
Federal Program Management. American
Politics Research 34: 22-50.
IV.
Executive-Legislative
Relations, and the Politics of Gridlock (March 29th)
Kiewiet, Rod, and Matt
McCubbins. 1988. Presidential Influence on Congressional
Appropriations Decisions. AJPS, 32: 713-736.
Bond, Jon, Richard Fleisher,
and B. Dan Wood. 2003. The Marginal and Time-Varying Effect of
Presidential Approval on Presidential Success in Congress. JOP, 65:92-110.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Scott de Marchi. 2002. Presidential Approval and Legislative
Success. Journal of Politics, 64:
491-509.
Binder, Sarah. 1999. The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96. APSR, 93 (September) 519-533.
Canes-Wrone,
William Howell, and David Lewis. 2008. Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reexamination of the Two Presidencies
Thesis. JOP, 70:1-16.
V.
Summing Up: Do Presidents Truly Lead or Merely
Facilitate? (April 5th)
Edwards book, ENTIRE.
PART THREE: THE SUPREME
COURT
I.
The Supreme Court: Nominations and Confirimations
(April 12th)
Segal, Jeffrey, Charles
Cameron, and Albert Cover. 1992.
A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents,
and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations. AJPS, Vol. 36, No. 1. (Feb., 1992), pp.
96-121
Moraski, Bryon, and Charles Shipan. 1999. The Politics of Supreme Court
Nominations: A Theory of Institutional
Constraints and Choices. AJPS, 43 (October):
1069-1095, .
Shipan, Charles, and Megan Shannon. 2003.
Delaying Justice: A Duration
Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations.
AJPS, 47: 654-668.
Johnson, Timothy, and Jason
Roberts. 2004. Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court
Confirmation Process. JOP, 66 (August),
p. 663.
Epstein, Lee, Rene Lindstatdt, Jeffrey Segal, and
McMahon, Kevin. 2007. Presidents, Political Regimes, and
Contentious Supreme Court Nominations. Law and Social Inquiry,
32 (Fall) 919-954.
II.
Public Attitudes Toward the Supreme Court,
Nominees, and Nominations (April 19)
Gibson and Caldeira,
entire book.
(including appendix article on effects of Bush
v. Gore).
III.
Supreme Court Decisionmaking: Attitudinal vs. Strategic Models (April 26)
Hammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan, read Chapters 1 -5 and
10-11; skim (and read conclusions to)
Chapters 6-9